The End of Man by Martinon, Jean-Paul

T h e  E n d  o f  M a n

The End of  Ma n
punctum books    brooklyn, ny
Jean-Paul Martinon
 
The End of Man
© Jean-Paul Martinon, 2013.
http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Th is work is Open Access, which means that you are 
free to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work 
as long as you clearly attribute the work to the authors, 
that you do not use this work for commercial gain in any 
form whatsoever, and that you in no way alter, transform, 
or build upon the work outside of its normal use in 
academic scholarship without express permission of the 
author and the publisher of this volume. For any reuse or 
distribution, you must make clear to others the license 
terms of this work.






Library of Congress Cataloging Data is available from 
the Library of Congress.
Cover Image: detail from Jacques-Louis David, Male 
Nude Known as Hector (1778); oil on canvas, Musée 
Fabre, Montpellier, France.






1. Th e Neuter 15
2. Sexual Diff erence 29
3. Male 45
4. Th e Side Story 57
5. End(s) Meet 69





A project of this kind can only be accomplished with the help 
and encouragement of many friends and individuals. To some 
I owe a special thanks. I am particularly grateful to Nicole 
Wolf, Michael O’Rourke, Eileen A. Joy, Sam Nightingale, Lynn 
Turner and Kamillea Aghtan. My thanks also to my colleagues 
in the Department of Visual Cultures and especially Jorella 
Andrews for allowing the impossible: taking a three-month 
sabbatical in the middle of the academic year. 
Many of the ideas in this book have been tried out on 
doctoral students and staff  at Goldsmiths College, fi rst as part 
of a seminar organised by INC Research Group in Continental 
Philosophy and later as part of the Visual Cultures PhD 
Programme. Th anks are due to all those who have listened, 
questioned, and challenged the ideas that follow. I am grateful 





At the time of bands such as Th e Cult and Jad Wio, friends 
would oft en fi nd me in dark corners of cavernous nightclubs 
dressed in black leather with eyeliner carefully applied inside 
the eye and grey eye shadow on the lower eyelid in order to 
accentuate the deathly appearance. My hair would be shoulder 
length and ironed straight. Underneath my jacket, I would 
wear a vest made of gaping black fi shnet material. Nine 
earrings would adorn my left  ear and numerous leather and 
old-silver bracelets would grace my wrists. I remember feeling 
proud of my skeletal frame and ultra-thin arms. In appear-
ance, I was a gender-bender, but in reality, my sexual life was 
simply undefi ned and unexplored. 
At the time of bands such as Goldfrapp and La Rue Ketanou, 
friends would oft en fi nd me in the brightly lit spaces of health-
clubs dressed in shorts, sneakers, and t-shirt with only mois-
turizer on my face. My hair would be a number one crew cut. 
In my left  hand, I would carry an energy drink. Aft er my 
workout, which consisted of a split-routine entirely designed 
to achieve maximum upper-body muscle growth, I would gulp 
down with much eff ort a high-protein and carbohydrate shake. 
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I remember feeling proud of the tiny gains in muscle growth. 
For all intents and purposes, I was a dedicated gym buff  with a 
clearly defi ned sexual identity.
At the time of bands such as Hanni El Khatib and DJs 
such as Sebastian Akchoté, friends would occasionally fi nd 
me in the sanitized world of fertility clinics dressed in a non-
descriptive way except for headphones as my sole distinctive 
feature. In my right hand, I would carry a sample pot, sheep-
ishly dropping it in a lidded bucket labelled ‘Man Samples 
Only,’ ready for analysis. Th e experience of having to coldly 
force something out of one’s body when this very body only 
understands this activity through the prism of selfi sh pleasure 
is a perplexing one. Th is added to the fact that what has always 
been casually discarded is now examined for its potential to 
outlive me makes for a disconcerting experience. Fertility 
clinics are places where no one feels pride, just baffl  ement at 
the ways human beings attempt to control and manipulate 
bodily functions. 
Th e above three moments refl ect three diff erent types of 
anxiety about being a man. 
Th e fi rst one is obviously rebellious, a way of questioning 
the idea of masculinity (and its supposed attributes: power, 
strength, virility, for example) from the advantage of youth. 
Th rough its own idiosyncratic dramatization of the signifying 
gestures of dress codes, it shows that it is not only aware of, but 
also relishes the performative nature of gender. 
Th e second one plays the opposite card: it conforms to a 
type of ideology promoted by contemporary society for which 
a man needs to look like Mark Walhberg in his Calvin Klein 
heyday, a kind of pathological exception turned into a prescrip-
tive norm. Th e self-awareness is here pushed to the limits 
because it does not aim to acquire a real and forbidding fl eshy 
armour that would be typical of a supposed ‘heterosexual’ 
identity, but on the contrary, to embody a self-conscious cliché 
of artifi cial maleness.1 
1 And thus obeying what Susan Faludi calls an ‘ornamental culture’: “In 
a culture of ornament, manhood is defi ned by appearance, by youth 
and attractiveness, by money and aggression, by posture and swagger, 
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Th e third one is obviously an anxiety about one’s ability to 
outlive oneself. It conforms to an unquestioned and suppos-
edly innate imperative: to sustain humanity’s ability to 
reproduce itself. In this way, the anxiety here is not entirely 
personal, it is also that of a world that asks itself, perhaps for 
the fi rst time in history, whether it is worth reproducing at all. 
And while everything in fertility clinics emphasizes artifi ci-
ality (from ‘procurement rooms’ to ‘gynaecological chairs’), 
human beings stubbornly cling on to the last scrap of a seem-
ingly obvious dignity: the ‘natural’ imperative to obey a 
commandment that is older than history itself.
Th ere is nothing unusual or exceptional about this short-
ened and incomplete three-step trajectory; on the contrary, 
it is a commonplace narrative about masculinity, manhood, 
and fatherhood at the turn of the millennium. However, it 
also raises the question of how a man is supposed to articulate 
himself in a world where the meaning of these terms have been 
so dramatically questioned so as to become practically mean-
ingless. Th e following text does not aim to be an exhaustive 
or comprehensive answer to that question. On the contrary, it 
attempts, with the use of a specifi c philosophical vocabulary 
and language, to revisit famous key concepts in the construc-
tion of masculinity, not in order to re-write or debunk them 
once more, but in order to provide a personal take on them. 
I don’t have long to live—twenty years if I compile both 
family history and society’s statistics. So if I take this real 
or imaginary deadline as an imperative to work out ‘what 
happened?’, then one of the questions that inevitably comes up 
is indeed this: how do I articulate my masculinity, manhood, 
and fatherhood? Th is does not imply that I will dwell in 
personal anecdotes or autobiographical details. Th e above 
trajectory suffi  ces. In reverse, this does not also imply that 
I will attempt to draw from my experiences either a generic 
perspective that would be applicable to all or an overarching 
theory of masculinity, maleness, and/or fatherhood. Th e aim is 
and ‘props,’ by the curled lip and fl exed biceps…”: Susan Faludi, Stiff ed: 
Th e Betrayal of the American Man (New York: Harper Perennial, 
2000), 38.
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simply to put forward a personal perspective on the intractable 
condition of being one man amongst many today. 
Th e intractability of this ‘condition’ is really what is at 
stake here. Th e aim is not to just talk about ‘me’ or about what 
counts ‘above all,’ ‘men,’ as if these could be understood as 
autonomous and rational animals with free wills, the apex of 
existence. Th e following takes for granted that men are imper-
fect, disunited, and always prey to ‘becoming’ some‘thing’ else 
and as such are not singular entities that can be analysed as 
such.2 Th e issue is on the contrary to emphasize this liminal 
‘condition’ that is both produced and inscribed and prevents 
‘me’ from ever ignoring or getting rid of this extra Y that 
appears to cause all the anxieties and insecurities mentioned 
above. If one takes in consideration this intractability, then, as 
the following text will attempt to show, I am; man is; or men 
are here neither fi rst nor foremost. Th is liminal ‘condition’ or 
end is.
* * *
But what end? Th e end in question in this book does not refer to 
the completion of an act (‘this is the end of the line for me’), the 
conclusion of a jury (‘this really is a man’), a fi nished project 
(‘nothing could be said aft er this’), or a subjective and arbi-
trary divination of the future, the result of a revelation without 
evidences, tributary of faith (‘men, frankly, are doomed’). If 
this were the case, then the mention of the word ‘end’ would 
simply refer not only to a false interiority (‘me’ or ‘us’ as a 
clearly identifi ed sum of past events), a false exteriority (‘he’ or 
‘them’: all the fellows next door), or a new beginning (a post- or 
2 Th ere is no space here to explore this topic. Suffi  ce to say that this 
book obviously adheres to the idea that man or menfolk in general 
are not just self-contained humans, but a zoo of posthumanity, in the 
sense developed, for example, by Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, 
“Introduction: Posthuman Bodies,” in Posthuman Bodies, ed. Judith 
Halberstam and Ira Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 1–20 and Cary Wolfe, ed., What Is Posthumanism? 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
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super-man). Patriarchy, masculinity, or men in general are not 
about to be wiped out; as far as I know I am not dead yet; and 
Aurobindo or Nietzsche’s predictions about overmen3 have not 
yet come into being. 
Th e end in the title of this book is therefore not conceived—
if this is really possible—as a fi gured end that would delimit 
or organize anthropologically or metaphysically a fi rst person 
(‘I’), a third (‘he’) or even a fi rst person plural (‘we, men’). In 
other words, the end in question here is not a representable line 
that would either picture or circumscribe ‘me’ or ‘us, men’ as 
if a clearly identifi able individual or group within humankind 
or as part of a generic set of abstract concepts. In order to avoid 
such a fi gured end (and therefore the inevitable accompanying 
assumptions about what lies beyond ‘it’: women or God, for 
example), it is necessary to think the end diff erently. But how?
One way, I think, an ‘end’ can be understood ‘diff erently’ is 
to remain both at a metaphysical and anthropological level. As 
is well known, the problem is indeed that it is simply impossible 
today to think of an anthropology without entrenching it in 
metaphysics.4 If I talk about ‘me’ as an anthropological topic, 
for example, I can only embed this topic within a metaphysical 
3 See Sri Aurobindo, Th e Life Divine [1914-19] (Pondicherry: Sri 
Aurobindo Ashram Press, 1990) and Friedrich Nietzsche, Th us Spoke 
Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1985).
4 Th e most acute description of this problem can be found in a footnote 
of Derrida’s famous text, “Th e Ends of Man.” I give here an abbreviated 
version for lack of space: “A) On the one hand, it is precisely when 
Kant wants to conceive of something as the end, the pure end, the end 
in itself, that he must criticize anthropologism, in the Metaphysics of 
Morals.… In this manner, all morals which need anthropology for 
their application to men must be completely developed fi rst, as pure 
philosophy, i.e. metaphysics, independently of anthropology… B) 
But on the other hand, … man is the only example, the only case of a 
reasonable being that can ever be cited at that very point at which the 
universal concept of reasonable being can justifi ably be distinguished 
from the concept of human being. It is at the point of this fact that 
anthropology recovers all of its authority which had been contested”: 
Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1982), 121–2.
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framework—about the limits of this ‘me,’ for example. 
Inversely, it is not possible to think a metaphysical issue 
without entrenching it within an anthropological context. If 
I take ‘man’ as a metaphysical topic, for example, I can only 
assume that there is a world-wide abstract understanding of 
this word. Th e problem is such that it simply cannot be over-
come. Metaphysics and anthropology cannot be understood 
independently of each other. But how is one then to under-
stand, what one should really call a meta-anthropology? What 
other familiar name does it have?
Perhaps it is simply what is called bio-graphy. Th e 
biographical is here understood not in the common sense of 
‘an account of my life,’ but in the sense of a formal organisation 
that would insinuate itself between metaphysics and anthro-
pology. In order to understand this, it is necessary to abandon 
the idea that metaphysics and anthropology are simply insti-
tutional disciplines and to take up the parallel idea that they 
are also practices. Th is can be said very simply: as I live, I write 
(literally or metaphorically) my own bio-graphy.5 In doing so, I 
am forced to delimit what I write not only in relation to others 
(thus defi ning myself in an anthropological context), but also 
in relation to what lies beyond this relation (thus defi ning 
myself in a metaphysical context). Th e bio-graphical is there-
fore a formal organization in as much as it is an attempt to 
trace the lived distinction between metaphysics and anthro-
pology. In other words, the bio-graphical is what marks—
graphein, to write—the dangerous delineation or passage 
between a spatially and temporally situated ‘bio/me’ and its 
ex-teriority or ex-cess. 
5 Th is does not imply treating myself as if another, but, following 
Derrida, as a type of writing that traces the experience of the 
impossible, an attempt to speak about what cannot be said, perceived, 
or be made present. Th e bio-graphical is therefore in this context 
what Derrida calls the “hetero-thanato-graphical”: writing one’s life 
as a matter of life-death. On this theme, see Jacques Derrida, Th e Post 
Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1987), 273 and 291 and passim.
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Th e end in the title of this book therefore refers to no 
limit, extremity, or fi nale strictly speaking, but to a formal 
organisation that in itself has no meaning, not because it is 
non-sense or absurd, but because it can only really prevaricate 
as that which separates and unites metaphysics and anthro-
pology, and in the process, writes both of them at once. Th e 
end is therefore paradoxically both an aporia (a non-passage) 
and a poros (a passage) that structures both metaphysics and 
anthropology, not as institutional disciplines, but as everyday 
practices (articulating or writing not only this recognizable 
man, but also what has as yet no name for it). A bio-graphy 
is thus what writes itself as man as I, he, or we break(s) open 
the future. 
Th e ‘end’ is in the singular because the aim is to empha-
size this curious a-poretic aspect, this singular intractability. 
Since it is not possible to envisage all of the attributes of one 
man in one single coherent discourse or theory, then the ques-
tion is really to uncover this aporia/poros that, for reasons 
that are both mine and not mine, reveals this man as suddenly 
appearing/disappearing at once. In this way, Th e End of Man 
eff ectively refers to a passage, not the clichéd thrusting passage 
into the other, but the im-proper passing into the unknown 
space and time of the other; a space and time that can never be 
understood as ‘belonging’ to what on all accounts can be ‘seen’ 
as this man. Against duration and multiplicity, Th e End of Man 
will then be this: this man is simply an end that bio-graphically 
marks the im-proper passing onto the other. 
As one might expect when it comes to a-poretic situations, 
the issue is not so much the passage onto the other as if this 
‘other’ can be understood as either ‘another’ self-contained 
bio-anthropological entity (a woman, for example) or a 
symbolic metaphysical radicality (God, for example), but to a 
wide range of subjects and objects, all of which have the unique 
characteristic of forming and inhabiting diff erent (bio-graph-
ical) spaces and times. Th e ‘other’ will therefore be here unde-
termined, not out of ignorance, neglect, lack of manners, or 
out of an andro-homo-phallo-centric need to occult women or 
God, but because to do otherwise would be to already project 
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and therefore appropriate this ‘other’ as the same as ‘me,’ and 
therefore—if I can make such a generalisation—the same as 
‘us, men.’ In other words, the focus of this book is this liminal 
formal organization or passing that gives onto, not a supposed 
‘opposite’ of man, but an ‘other’ who or that cannot be defi ned 
because he, she, it, or they is/are always already to-come. 
* * *
Th e structure of the following text is accidental. It simply 
follows the path of reading and thinking for this specifi c 
research project. Although a thread runs through the book, its 
chapters can be read independently of each other. Th e bibliog-
raphy attached at the end of this short book is not intended to 
be exhaustive of the topic. It is only given as an indication of 
the sources that were used to make up the following arguments 
and as an indication of potential further reading. Th e hope 
behind such a methodology is two-fold: to avoid at all cost the 
assumption of (phallic) coherence and mastery (‘I know what 
I am talking about’) and to avoid playing the hidden game of 
buggery that scholarly work tirelessly entails (‘I’m right, he 
or she is wrong’). Th is two-fold hope is not only intended to 
pay homage to the many human bodies, subjects, and voices 
that produce and consume texts and who do not easily fall 
for the usual blinkered and dogmatic views that society (and 
the academy) imposes on all of us, but also to ensure  that the 
following book remains always on the verge of losing its meta-
physical and anthropological footing.6
Having written this, I ought, nonetheless, to fi nish by 
clarifying a little the specifi c choice of scholarship that was used 
to write this book, especially with regards to the issue of time 
6 As such, this text will strive as much as possible to not resemble a 
body. As Jean-Luc Nancy remarks: “Plato wants discourse to have the 
well-constituted body of a big animal, with a head, stomach, and tail. 
So all of us, we, good Platonists of old standing, know and don’t know 
what a discourse lacking a head and tail would be… We know it’s non-
sense, but we don’t know what to make of this ‘non-sense,’ we don’t see 
past the tip of sense. We always assent to sense: beyond sense, we lose 
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as it directly informs and structures the unusual liminality 
envisaged in Th e End of Man. Th e following text attempts to 
stay as close as possible to a particular philosophical tradition 
that emphasizes the inescapable distinction between homoge-
neous and heterogeneous times, a distinction originally put 
forward by both Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas 
and subsequently articulated by a number of authors in conti-
nental philosophy.7 Th ere is unfortunately no space to unpack 
this particular distinction in the narrow context of this intro-
duction. However, for the sake of clarity, here is perhaps what 
can be said in the most telegraphic style imaginable:
Homogeneous time refers to any kind of linear temporality. 
It is a type of time that necessarily confuses time with history, 
and therefore with durations or narratives that are seen to 
perdure over a period of time. In what concerns us here, the 
most common example of homogeneous time is ‘straight’ 
time, i.e. the set of chrono-normative frames that regulate 
‘heterosexual’ life. For example: growing up, marriage, work, 
reproduction and death. Each of these frames takes time and 
therefore can be articulated as a series of homogeneous times 
(linear, reproductive, cyclical, etc.). Now, this is not exclusive 
to ‘heterosexuals.’ Homogeneous time also refers to ‘queer’ 
time, i.e. to this other set of chrono-normative frames that 
regulate ‘queer’ life, for example: the transient, the fl eeting, the 
contingent, i.e. anything that is unscripted by the conventions 
of family, inheritance, and child rearing. However transient, 
instant and nocturnal, each of these frames nonetheless 
takes time and therefore can also be  articulated as a series of 
our footing”: Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. R. A. Rand (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), 13.
7 For such distinction, see: Martin Heidegger, Th e Concept of Time, 
trans. W. McNeill (London: Blackwell, 1992) and Emmanuel Levinas, 
Time and the Other, trans. R. A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1987). Since it is not possible to account here for the 
numerous books that further articulate such a divide, I can only point 
therefore in the direction of the bibliography included in a previous 
book: Jean-Paul Martinon, On Futurity: Malabou, Nancy, and Derrida 
(London: Palgrave, 2007). 
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homogeneous times, even if they are perceived as disjunctive 
(‘I live a non-reproductive life’), intransitive (‘I live without a 
care for tomorrow’), interruptive (‘I live in rebellion against 
continuity and  progress’), etc.8 In any given context, homo-
geneous time is what allows us to understand ourselves as 
Foucauldian bio-political constructs and this whether we are 
‘heterosexual,’ ‘homosexual’ or ‘queer.’9 
By contrast, heterogeneous time refers to the radical 
questioning of such linear or homogeneous time. Th is is a 
8 Incorporating ‘queer’ time within the context of homogeneous times 
implies making a necessary departure from the conventional assump-
tion that ‘queers’ inhabit alternate temporalities. Th ey don’t. We don’t. 
However long or short, ‘queer’ times still respect linear, teleological, 
and even chronological narratives. Th ese include the historical tempo-
ralities, life schedules, and alternative economic practices deployed, for 
example, by Judith Halberstam in In a Queer Time and Place. However 
disruptive, Halberstam’s temporalities still obey the paradigmatic 
aspects of homogeneous time. Th e same can be said of other formula-
tions of ‘queer’ temporalities, like for example, those exposed by Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick in, amongst others, Tendencies. However they are 
formulated, ‘queer’ time resembles ‘straight’ time precisely because 
their very utterance can do nothing else but to obey the rules of linear, 
teleological and chronological development not only in order to make 
sense, but also and above all to be narrated as such. Th ere would be no 
‘queer’ time and above all no performative acts of experimental self-
perception and fi liation if there were no ‘moments’ of recollection, that 
is, eff orts to create a recognizable time frame with a ‘before’ and an 
‘aft er.’ On this topic, see: Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place: 
Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: New York University 
Press, 2005); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Tendencies (London: Routledge, 
1994). See also the following commentaries: Stephen M. Barber and 
David L. Clark, “Queer Moments: Th e Performative Temporalities 
of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,” in Regarding Sedgwick: Essays on Queer 
Culture and Critical Th eory, ed. Stephen M. Barber and David L. 
Clark (London: Routledge, 2002), 1–53 and Elizabeth Freeman, Time 
Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2010).
9 Th ese terms are placed here and in the rest of the book in inverted 
commas in order to highlight the fact that they are invented abstrac-
tions. For a further explanation on this, see chapter 5, “End(s) Meet.”
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really diffi  cult thought because it is rebellious to any form of 
articulation. To put it as ‘simply’ as possible, heterogeneous 
time refers to a type of questioning10 that is so radical and 
so extreme that it cannot even take the shape of a question, 
let alone the shape of an empirical fact and/or metaphorical 
idea. Th e heterogeneity of this particular time is so diverse and 
incommensurable that it is impossible to totalize or homog-
enize. It is what is strictly allergic to language and as such 
knows no measure, no language or translation. Th is, however, 
does not mean that it is otherworldly or divine and as such 
exists elsewhere as the radical or negative opposite of homo-
geneous time. Heterogeneous time shoots through homoge-
neous time every  second of time.11 It is that which disturbs 
all becomings, durations, and narratives, even those that are 
supposedly ‘anachronous’ or ‘asynchronous.’12 Heterogeneous 
10 A questioning that leads Heidegger to stop short at his famous fi nal 
question: “Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer 
still: am I my time?”: Heidegger, Th e Concept of Time, 22.
11 Th ere is no space here to explore the subtle diff erence between 
heterogeneous time and messianic time, but the use of Benjamin’s 
famous expression (‘shot through’) is obviously intended to reference 
a similar radicality, one that aff ords no homogeneity, narrative, projec-
tion or prediction. See Walter Benjamin, “Th eses in the Philosophy 
of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zorn 
(London: Pimlico, 1973), 245–6.
12 Once again, the only way ‘anachronic’ or ‘asynchronic’ identities can 
indeed make sense would be if a teleological and therefore synchronic 
duration allowed them to be heard. As such, they would necessarily 
always need to fall within the context of linear (i.e. homogeneous) 
temporalities (however logically interruptive or preposterous these 
are). Th is does not re-inscribe heteronormativity as the only mode of 
fashioning or understanding identities or histories. Th is only high-
lights the impossibility of escaping the teleological structure of words, 
phrases, and discourses. For an example of this kind of ‘anachronic’ 
or ‘asynchronic’ (but nonetheless synchronic) identity, see the 
remarkable work of Carolyn Dinshaw, especially in “Temporalities,” 
in Middle English, ed. Paul Strohm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 107–23. For excellent accounts of the problems historians face 
when addressing sexual taxonomies in general, see Madhavi Menon, 
“Spurning Teleology in Venus and Adonis,” in GLQ: A Journal of 
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time is eff ectively what makes me speechless, in awe, or simply 
recoil in horror at the stupidity of what has just happened.
Taking this distinction as seriously as is humanly possible, 
the following book can therefore only make occasional refer-
ences to the vast expanse of oft en confl icting and contradic-
tory linear temporalities that usually criss-cross or assemble a 
life and this one in particular (aff ects, belongings, becomings, 
histories, etc.). Th e scarcity of these references is not intended 
to dismiss their importance or their (temporary) political 
potential. Th e aim is simply to avoid not only quick narratives 
about one particular sex or gender, but also generalizations 
about who ‘I’ am or ‘what men are like.’ Th e aim is therefore 
to explore how time and a specifi c gender articulate them-
selves and to examine in some detail our understanding of this 
gender’s seductive, bizarre, awesome, frightening and pathetic 
occurrences. 
As such, this text situates itself on the margins of the 
majority of texts written in the fi eld of sexual and gender 
studies and more specifi cally, masculinity studies. Th is does 
not mean that this book is written in order to be deliber-
ately obscurantist. To be on the margins is not to choose a 
marginal discourse, but to faithfully remain ‘queer’ about all 
these discourses, that is, to remain at odds with what is already 
established as the norm (queer theory included).13 Th e reason 
for such marginality, oddness, or queerness is simply that the 
radicality of heterogeneous time (as briefl y defi ned above and 
as referred to later in this book and elsewhere as the law of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies 11, no. 4 (2005): 491–519 and Glenn Burger 
and Steven F. Kruger, “Introduction,” in Queering the Middle Ages, 
ed. Glenn Burger and Steven F. Kruger (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001), xi–xxii.
13 In saying this, I remain simply faithful to David Halperin’s under-
standing of the word ‘queer’: “Queer is by defi nition whatever is 
at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant”: David 
Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 62. See also, Jonathan Kemp’s commentary on 
this defi nition in Jonathan Kemp, “Queer Past, Queer Present, Queer 
Future,” Graduate Journal of Social Science 6, Special Issue 1 (2009): 12.
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absolute heterogeneity) can never be, as this text will strive to 
demonstrate, either casually forgotten, weakened, or simply 
glossed over.14 Th e marginality, or perhaps more precisely, the 
rogueishness15 of Th e End of Man is therefore due to the impos-
sibility of evading this radical questioning, the possibilities 
off ered by an absolute interruption.
Finally, the following book is written at the intersection 
of three bodies of work: the works of Emmanuel Levinas, 
Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Nancy. ‘At the intersection’ 
only because, as stated above, there will be here no commen-
taries on their work. Th e End of Man attempts instead to think 
further their remarkable arguments about masculinity, sexu-
ality, and gender. For example, it takes on board Levinas’s 
notion of paternity, but leaves aside its patriarchal connota-
tions. At another level, it develops Derrida’s idea of a chore-
ography of sexual diff erences, but without leaving it stranded 
in a correlationist diff erential.16 Finally, it adheres to Nancy’s 
14 Just to be clear, the following text therefore places itself neither with 
nor against what has been called the temporal turn in Queer Th eory, 
but perhaps slightly off -kilter, if this is at all possible. Th e reason for 
such oddness or queerness is simply to emphasize the impossibility 
of pitching a ‘queer’ or ‘homo’-normative time against a ‘straight’ or 
‘hetero’-normative time. Whatever we do with our genitals or bodies 
changes nothing to the fact that the future remains, however we strive 
to predict it, always already radically unknown. For the scholarship 
marking this temporal turn, see the path-breaking special issue 
dedicated to ‘queer’ temporalities edited by Elizabeth Freeman in: 
GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13, nos. 2–3 (2007), doi: 
10.1215/10642684-2006-029, and the excellent, E.L. McCallum and 
Mikko Tuhkanen, eds., Queer Times, Queer Becomings (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2011). See also Michael O’Rourke’s 
clear analyses on the same topic in “Th e Aft erlives of Queer Th eory,” 
continent. 1.2 (2011): 102–16.
15 For this expression, see Michael O’Rourke’s roguish, but nonetheless 
prudent and scholarly essay: “Th e Roguish Future of Queer Th eory,” 
SQS: Journal of Queer Studies in Finland 2 (2006): 22–47.
16 Th ere is no space or need here to mount a critique of Derrida’s work 
within the framework of speculative realism. Suffi  ce to say that it is 
impossible today to not acknowledge the fact that Derrida never really 
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understanding of the body as an ex-scription17 of sense, but 
without turning it into an ecstatic, but strangely infertile 
reformulation of Christian incarnation. Th e aim of such 
an ‘intersectional’ work is simply to venture forth into the 
unknown, just when I can no longer recognize their writing 
or mine. 
manages to give shape to his idea that sexual diff erence stands for a 
relentless choreography imposed by diff érance. How do we dance 
otherwise? How do we sustain the challenge against the locus, the 
certain, the established: male, female? Derrida remains silent. Th is does 
not mean that we should damn him as enthusiastic speculative realists 
oft en do. Th is simply means that it is now time to expose the shape of 
this dance, the many ways of playing the game. For a good analysis of 
Derrida and sexual diff erence, see Anne-Emmanuelle Berger, “Sexing 
Diff érance,” in Diff erences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 16, 
no. 3 (2005): 52–67.
17 “To write, and to read, is to be expected, to expose oneself, to this not-
having (to [Bataille’s] non-knowledge) and thus to ‘exscription.’ Th e 
exscribed is exscribed from the very fi rst word, not as an ‘inexpressible’ 
or as an ‘un-inscribable’ but, on the contrary, as writing’s opening, 
within itself, to itself, to its own inscription as the infi nite discharging 
of meaning—in all the senses in which we must understand the 
expression”: Jean-Luc Nancy, “Exscription,” in Th e Birth to Presence, 
trans. K. Lydon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 338.
1. The Neuter
introduction
It is neuter. Th is does not mean that it has been neutered. It 
started neuter. It plays and works neuter and the same can 
be said when it is eating, drinking, or relieving itself. Th ere 
is no moment that can be pinpointed as being ‘not-neuter.’ 
Even when it sleeps, it remains neuter. And when it wakes up, 
like it does now on a lazy summer aft ernoon, it is still neuter, 
even with its hard-on. It never ceases to be neuter, even when 
it is weak or about to die. How is one to understand this odd 
neuter? 
Th e contradictions of the above paragraph need not be 
emphasized: an erection is not neuter; it is an enlarged and 
rigid biological protuberance that clearly indicates that a man 
is in question here. However, over and beyond (or under and 
beneath) this bio-anthropological determination, is there not 
(also) something utterly neuter about ‘it’? 
Although the neuter in question here refers somewhat to 
the body, it does not stand for ‘the body’ as such. Th e neuter 
is not a generic physical structure comprehensible by all or 
a symbolic substitute for mankind in general. If this were 
the case, then the two (the body and the neuter) would be 
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confused to the point of being interchangeable. Th e neuter has 
something to do with the body, but it is not ‘the body.’ 
And it is not ‘the soul,’ ‘the spirit’ or ‘a monad’ either. 
If this were the case, then the neuter would be a transcen-
dental referent (representing a reductive entity or a superior 
consciousness, for example) that, in order to exist would 
somehow need to be put in relation with ‘the body.’ Th e neuter 
evades both these false dichotomies and these unnecessary 
reductions or elevations. 
Just so that there is no confusion; the neuter in question 
here is also not Dasein. As is well known, Heidegger under-
stands Dasein qua Dasein as sexually neutral.17 He even talks of 
an originary and powerful asexual neutrality (Neutralität). In 
saying this, Heidegger’s aim is to think Dasein as a primordial 
structure that sustains the binary of sexes. Dasein is therefore 
sexually neutral because as Dasein it does not carry with it the 
mark of this opposition (or alternative) between the two sexes. 
As will become clear, the neuter in the following text 
departs from this interpretation for a simple reason: it 
insists on using the word neuter and not neutral. Th e neuter 
specifi cally relates to sex and gender, while the neutral can be 
understood as unrelated to these terms. Th is simple reason 
allows for a re-thinking of sex and gender that is not neces-
sarily related to what could lie out-, in-, or along-side of it: 
Dasein qua Dasein. Having said this, the following text still 
retains Heidegger’s insight that, like the neutral, the neuter 
is (also) what disperses the body. Th e question—and this 
is what will need to be addressed—is whether it can do this 
without relating to Dasein also dispersing itself positively in 
its facticity.
Finally, the neuter in question here is not a desire. Roland 
Barthes famously made this move from the neuter as a state 
to the desire for the neuter in order to a) avoid essentializing 
it, b) suspend (épochè) all forms of orders and, c) by way of 
17 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962), §10.
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deepening, refuse all forms of opposition (including gender).18 
Th is move will not be repeated here because what concerns us 
above all is to expose not only the contradictory nature of the 
neuter (it includes oppositions and negotiates orders), but also, 
in a more Barthean move, its complexity, the fact that it cannot 
be totalized.
With these side-glances towards Heidegger and Barthes in 
mind, the neuter will therefore be presented most simply as a 
spatial and temporal quasi-bodily movement that cannot be 
distinguished from the advent of space and time.19 
Please note: once again, there will be no assumption here 
that the addressee of this text will identify with this neuter, 
saying, for example ‘Oh, yes, I identify myself in this neuter’ 
or ‘Th is neuter feels just like me.’ Th e reason being that the 
word ‘neuter’ names in fact something that can be recognized, 
but cannot be made generic. As such, the neuter can only off er 
itself as a word that always misses on the opportunity of being 
pinned down and therefore shared as a generic characteristic 
common to all.
Th e neuter will therefore be here idiosyncratic to the one 
who addresses it with all its fl aws and qualities. As such, 
this neuter will probably amuse, occasionally annoy, or even 
perhaps, in some acute moments, infuriate. Unfortunately, 
nothing can be done to stop this. Th is neuter simply ‘is’—
without ‘being’ exactly. Th e addressee—whoever he or she 
18 See Roland Barthes, Th e Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de 
France (1977-1978), trans. R. E. Krauss and D. Hollier (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), especially, 188–95.
19 Although Jean-Luc Nancy does not specifi cally address the neuter, 
his understanding of the body and how it relates to the advent of space 
and time are crucial here. As he says, for example: “Space and time are 
the two names for birth; this double name is necessary so that there is 
a coming, weighing, or lift ing of event, which is neither a point nor a 
present (neither space nor time), but presentation (imperfection). In 
this way, space is no longer spread and riddled with landmarks; time 
is no longer irreversible and a line of successions, but one by the other 
open, not just opened, but opening: the opening of a place, the taking-
place of this place”: Jean-Luc Nancy, La Naissance des seins (Valence: 
École régionale des beaux-arts, 1996), 17, my translation.
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is—can either put up with it or just leave it and move over to 
the next section.
Unfortunately, those who can bravely ignore fl aws and 
qualities and are able to stick with this neuter will face a rather 
abstract exposure. Although occasional glimpses towards 
more fi gurative horizons will be made in the aim of relieving 
the dryness of the abstraction, entertainment, in this fi rst 
chapter, cannot be guaranteed. Unfortunately, this neuter 
suff ers from being unable to sit long enough for it to be fi gured 
or represented and therefore pinned down for judgement… 
but I let you judge.
reference
Going against its well-known etymological origin, this neuter 
will not be understood here as what is ‘neither this nor that,’ 
‘neither one nor the other.’ To refer to this etymological origin 
assumes the following question: if it is ‘neither this nor that,’ 
then ‘what is it’? Th e reference therefore assumes the possibility 
of a third option: a fl aw or a relief from the proposed alterna-
tive: this or that. But, as will be shown, this neuter is not a third 
option or an impersonal ‘one’ and it cannot be understood as 
the question that leads to the third.
Foreign to this familiar etymology, this neuter therefore 
has to be accepted as an event, whether it is this or that and 
even if it is neither this nor that. Th e problem with an event 
is that it can never be totalised; it cannot be part of a calculus 
or a reasoning system. Th e neuter simply escapes all forms of 
totalisation. Inversely, this neuter cannot be hollowed out of 
all contents; it cannot be emptied or made into a vacuum. Th e 
neuter in question here is eff ectively that which always lends 
itself to be totalised or hollowed out, but never manages to 
accomplish either of these states. Th is is the fi rst alienating 
aspect of this neuter, the hallmark of any event (that of being 
this ‘man,’ for example). 
However much it is alienating and evasive, one thing is 
certain: Contrary to popular opinion, this neuter is not an 
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inanimate thing and it is not something inert or passive. Th e 
neuter in question here is both, curiously, animate and inani-
mate, active and passive, inert and dynamic. It strangely has all 
these characteristics. Th e most annoying aspect of this state of 
aff airs is that neither its animate nor its inanimate aspects, for 
example, can be identifi ed independently from the other. Th ey 
‘cohabit’ making up this neuter as it manifests itself.
it, always
As such, this neuter is not very seductive. Th ere is no fantasy 
of neutrality, impartiality, or unbiased positioning hiding here 
under the non-nomination ‘neuter.’ As celebrities tirelessly 
remind us, only what marks itself as diff erent or exceptional 
(within or outside of the neither/nor scheme) manages to 
seduce. Th e neuter in question here is far too complex to be 
truly seductive. It attracts and repels at the same time even 
when it gently awakes as it does right now.
Th is lack of seductiveness makes it perversely equivocal. 
Th is equivocality prevents anyone from identifying it as 
a subject with any certainty. In other words, it never comes 
across as a speaking person or a thinking and feeling entity. 
Th is neuter is eff ectively always already open to interpreta-
tion, questioning, probing, never fi nished or completed. Th is 
equivocal ‘nature’ never allows it to be anchored as something 
determinable that would be a part or a structure of subjec-
tivity, for example—even if this subjectivity is understood as 
always performing or simply to-come. 
Paradoxically, this lack of seductiveness also prevents 
it from being treated as an object, let alone a ‘proper’ object 
of study. In other words, it simply can never be objectifi ed 
as such. Although it is the topic of this fi rst chapter, the 
convoluted ways of describing it—avoiding at all cost ‘neither-
nor’ sentences and therefore third options—shows that 
it can never be understood as a solid mass or an ethereal 
matter that can be scrutinised by either objective sciences or 
subjective narration.
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But, and however contradictory this sounds, it nonetheless 
allows itself to be recognizable both as some ‘one’ who deserves 
attention (someone who deserves a kiss or a slap in the face, 
for example) and as a mere ‘thing’ that deserves to be indexed, 
identifi ed, dissected, analysed, and then (inevitably) discarded. 
While the ontic sciences (physics when it comes to the neuter 
as object or psychoanalysis when it comes to the neuter as 
subject, for example) congratulate themselves in their attempts 
to master it, the question always remains: which of the two 
(some ‘one’ or a mere ‘thing’) will you choose? In other words, 
what is it: an object or a subject?
Unfortunately, this neuter cannot help you decide. It will 
remain always already both equivocally subject and object. As 
such, this neuter can therefore never be a pure ‘I’ or ‘you’ and 
it can never be a ‘He’ or a ‘She’ either. It remains irritatingly 
‘it,’ not quite substantive, not quite being, maybe the very work 
of being an ‘I’ or a ‘you,’ a ‘she’ or a ‘he.’ ‘Maybe’ only, for it is 
impossible to assume a clear and distinctive relation between 
this neuter and either of these pronouns.
a-body
All this might lead one to think that the neuter is a non-body, 
a Stoic or Deleuzian incorporeal,20 or some impersonal lack of 
distinction that unites or characterizes us all under the sun, for 
example. Th is couldn’t be further from this neuter. Th is neuter 
is corporeal; it is a body with organs, hairy, bulky, smelly. It has 
bodily functions. It pisses and it cries. In doing so, it soils and 
leaves marks of diff erence. 
And yet, this neuter cannot be reduced to a body strictly 
speaking. Th e reason being that this neuter never lets itself be 
recognized as an entity that can be identifi ed: a body in need 
of relief or medication, for example. Th is neuter sweats, but it 
is never ‘that which sweats’: a ‘sweator,’ for example. Th e same 
goes for ejaculations, defecations, tears, and bad breaths. No 
20 See Gilles Deleuze, Th e Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester (London: 
Continuum, 2003), 8–9.
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particular bodily function can identify it because it comes 
with the process of identifi cation, with the recognition that it 
is an ‘I who sweats,’ a ‘he who suff ers from hyperhidrosis,’ a 
‘we who ejaculate, defecate, or stink.’ Th is neuter is therefore 
clearly not quite a body as such.
In this way, this neuter—i.e. this odd body/non body—can 
only make sense when it becomes manifest, that is, when it 
encounters other bodies, other things, other objects—some-
one’s anus or the porcelain of a urinal, for example. Without 
these other bodies, without these other things, there would be 
no neuter, for they are what allows it to become manifest, not 
as if an alter-ego or hostage-taker,21 not as if a receptacle or 
an undetermined background, but as the condition that allows 
friction between things and beings in general. 
Th is does not mean that there is ‘a friction’ called ‘the 
neuter’ that would exist between bodies or non-bodies, not 
even when there is evidence: a rash or a slash, for example. 
Th e neuter becomes manifest but never turns into a manifes-
tation in its own right. It is ‘the other’—as un/defi ned in the 
Introduction—that or who presupposes and determines—but 
not exclusively—this neuter that knows no proper bodily or 
ethereal referent. 
21 Th is references Levinas’s argument that the other holds me ‘hostage.’ 
To say the opposite is not a way of contradicting or going against 
Levinas, it is simply an attempt to think the situation in which the 
other indeed holds us ‘hostage’ and yet paradoxically we are (also) the 
hostage-takers, a ‘condition’ of friction that puts less emphasis on the 
necessarily overwhelming interference of the radically other ‘in me.’ I 
develop this argument in Aft er ‘Rwanda’ (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013). 
Here is an example of how Levinas describes the situation of always 
already being a hostage of the other: “We are always someone else’s 
hostage, but not so that we can go and complain about it”: Emmanuel 
Levinas and Michaël de Saint Cheron, Conversations with Emmanuel 
Levinas, 1983-1994 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2010), 37.
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the complex
Th is odd animate/inanimate, body/non-body status does not 
mean that it is unreal. Th e neuter looses no grip on (or a sense 
of) reality. In the same way that it only becomes manifest when 
encountering ‘the other,’ it is also aff ected by others (bodies 
or things) and this friction of aff ects gives it its reality. Th e 
problem is that, unfortunately, the reality in question here 
can never be totalised. Indefi nite, the neuter can terrify as it 
relaxes; it can calm as it becomes exasperated: contradictory 
states that can take place simultaneously. 
In doing so, the neuter therefore exposes both reality’s 
distinctiveness (its recognizable sharp and urgent features, 
for example), but also its strangeness (what makes it remain 
always incomprehensible, for example). In other words, the 
neuter fuses with reality without disappearing altogether and 
in the process reveals reality as well as its (own) contradictions.
In this way and to follow Roland Barthes’ well-known line 
of thought, this neuter is “the complex;”22 it consists of many 
diff erent parts that annoyingly can never be made one because 
they fuse with other realities. As such, the neuter can never be 
a neat juxtaposition of body and soul or a complex network of 
fl esh, blood, and organs—not even when it slowly turns into a 
corpse. It just consists of many diff erent parts, each of which 
come and go logically, but also, paradoxically, without any 
proper logic or rationale.
As such, the neuter is what is unbearable to doxa, 
withstands received opinion, and annoys the middle classes 
and their numbing (virtual) chitchat. But this does not mean 
that it is a vague or a fuzzy concept, like ‘the androgyne’ or 
‘consciousness,’ for example. Real bio-graphical organiza-
tions (such as this neuter lying here in the sun) do not exclude 
concreteness. Th e neuter is ‘here’ embodying a sleeping man, 
and as such it is necessarily and eminently concrete. Th e 
problem is simply that thought is unable to catch and freeze-
frame it in order to discard it and immediately move over to 
22 See Barthes, Th e Neutral, 190.
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another opinion. Doxa simply hates the neuter, but the feeling 
is mutual.
Some say that this neuter is therefore useless because it 
always already comes with the oppositions that make language 
comprehensible. Its complexity prevents it from being 
politically ‘useful,’ for example. Th e problem really is that the 
neuter remains both borne by the whole language (and there-
fore describable and useful as such) and that which, amidst 
oppositions, never enters language properly (and therefore 
remains always diffi  cult to describe or use as such). Th e neuter 
is therefore both useful and useless. Th e political is doxa’s 
sister and therefore harbours more or less the same feelings 
towards the neuter.
sexed and gendered
However strange this might seem, especially if one considers 
this aft ernoon’s hard-on, this neuter is what carries no mark 
of opposition (against the female sex or women, for example). 
Th e issue here is that in common language, the very word 
‘neuter’ usually implies, as seen above, a reference to a binary 
opposition: neuter versus masculine and feminine, for 
example. Th e problem is that this neuter cannot be submitted 
to or positioned against such binary poles. It remains with 
both at all times and yet never belongs properly to one or the 
other. Th e neuter is improper, but even that is not its property.
However, this neuter should not therefore be understood as 
a paradoxical prototype for the human, a type of sexlessness or 
a ‘genderless thing.’ It is not an ‘us,’ an indiff erent ‘nobody and 
everybody,’ or an a-phallic and a-cephallic generic state some-
what mysteriously recognizable across the bumpy plurality of 
bodies. Th e neuter is the primordial complex positivity that 
takes place before sexuality and gender. In other words, this 
neuter is a decisive positivity that comes before the specifi cation 
of sex and gender as binaries.23 
23 Th e idea of a primordial positivity is inspired by, but departs 
signifi cantly from, Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein’s neutrality. 
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Primordial? Before? Uh?
Th is neuter must indeed be understood as preceding 
any form of dichotomies or bi-polar (a)symmetries. Th is 
precedence is due to the fact that the neuter cancels the one 
and outnumbers the two and as such precedes both the one and 
the two (neither/nor, masculine/feminine, male/female, etc.). 
In other words, it precedes because it is a positivity that knows 
no diff erent. It is that which comes ‘before’ binaries.
However, the ‘before’ in question here is a curious one. 
However much, it appears to indicate a period of time that 
precedes another, however much it gives the impression that 
there is an order of priority, this ‘before’ must be under-
stood, following Jacques Derrida, in a situation that knows 
no literal, chronological, historical, or logical meaning.24 Th e 
‘before’ in question here simply means what disperses sexual 
diff erence and the diff erence of sexes and genders as bi-polar 
(a)symmetries.
In this way, this neuter is not a rejection of sex or gender, 
the negation of the feminine and the masculine, for example. 
It is the positive dispersion of sex and gender. Th is neuter 
disperses its own sex, which here, for example, happens to 
be male. In this way, this neuter disperses this morning’s 
Th e reasons for departing in such a way from Heidegger’s original 
formulation is simple: the argument about the neuter is neither 
attached to nor dependent on Dasein, that is, to an understanding of 
man as a being for which its own proper mode of being is not indif-
ferent. Th e neuter is here analysed precisely as a characteristic of what 
is not neutral, that is, of what is always already contaminated by the 
other. Th e neuter concerns a ‘with’ (cum) that knows no unicity or 
directionality. For Heidegger’s argument on the neutrality of Dasein, 
see: Martin Heidegger, Th e Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. 
M. Heim (Indiana University Press, 1984), 136–40.
24 Jacques Derrida uses the word ‘prior.’ See Jacques Derrida and 
Christie V. McDonald, “Choreographies,” Diacritics 12, no. 2 (Summer 
1982): 74. See also Derrida’s commentary on this priority, espe-
cially in relation to space (making the diff erence between spacing 
and space as extension) in Jacques Derrida, “Geschlecht: Sexual 
Diff erence, Ontological Diff erence,” Research in Phenomenology 13, 
no. 1 (1983): 77.
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hardness, the needy weightiness of its scrotum, or any other 
erogenous or non-erogenous part of this very body. Preceding 
binary sex and gender, this neuter therefore ‘positives’ itself 
and in the process leaves hallucinatory projections and desires 
that postulates it as this or that (masculine or feminine, for 
example) to the economy of binary sex.
Such a weird precedence shows that the neuter is the 
event that baffl  es paradigms, and fi rst amongst many, the 
sexual paradigm. It baffl  es because it is a positivity that never 
manages to fall back, yet again, into anatomical, biological or 
anthropological determinations. It is what invents (sexual and 
gender) determinations and hence can only leave the one that 
disperses them baffl  ed, bewildered or perplexed as to why he 
is so determined.
All this has a terribly annoying consequence: the neuter 
and the masculine can no longer be seen as synonymous. Th is 
neuter does not stand for a specifi c sex or gender. It is not a 
secret substitute for men or a stable referent and its positivity is 
not a power or a violation of the other. No women are subjected 
here under a parody of (male) universality. On the contrary, 
this neuter is the start of sexes and genders even though it can 
never be identifi ed as a starting point or an origin as such.
dispersion
While it lounges there in the aft ernoon sun slowly rousing 
from sleep, with its 22 pairs of chromosomes and its two extra 
set: X and Y; this neuter thus positively disperses itself. Th is is 
a pre-diff erential dispersion, a pre-sexual dispersion, or to be 
more precise, the primordial positive dispersion of the body 
‘before’ its sexual and gendered determination in concrete 
form. Th is does not mean that, as dispersion, it is recognizable 
as a unitary, homogeneous, or undiff erentiated proto-event: 
‘an in-born or in-herent neutral dispersal,’ for example. 
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Coinciding with the advent of space and time, this neuter 
positively spaces (and) temporizes itself in its dispersion.25 Th is 
dispersing therefore starts not here or there, but from the fact 
of being with others. It disperses itself as it sheds skin, its nails 
grow, its skin sags and as ‘all this’ comes in contact with others 
in the great dusty, sweaty, clammy maelstrom of humanity. 
Th e neuter is the slow dispersal ‘towards’ the other and the 
night—and this, even when the sun is still high.
As remarked above, this dispersion curiously knows no 
language and yet it forms and is formed by language. Th is 
neuter, this spacing (and) temporizing, indeed disperses at 
the moment when, as language, this ‘origin’ submits to its 
law. In other words, this neuter spaces (and) temporizes itself 
just when language imposes the weighty rule that makes it 
comprehensible as a neuter. In this way, although it is a ‘start,’ 
this neuter never escapes the laws of language, hence the fact 
that it can still be (more or less) articulated. 
But, and this will annoy even more, there is therefore no 
way of understanding this dispersion as if it were a ‘work,’ 
like the work of the negative, for example. Th ere is no labour, 
operation, or performance here, and there is no negation 
or opposition. Th is neuter positively disperses and always 
displaces itself out of its dispersal, thus making it impossible 
to ascribe it a proper ground, course, centre or reversal as such. 
But how is one, fi nally and to fi nish, to make sense of 
this odd ‘positivity’ that does not even have the politeness 
25 As I have done in my previous books, On Futurity and Aft er ‘Rwanda’, 
and following the observation adhered to in the Introduction, I make 
a distinction between space and time and spacing (and) temporizing, 
with the latter’s conjunction always bracketed. Th e former refers to 
measurable space and time and therefore to things that lend them-
selves to mathematical calculations and historical interpretation. 
Th e latter refers to the radical unhinging of space and time, as far as 
language permits us to hear it. For the words ‘spacing’ and ‘temporizing’ 
in Derrida’s work, see: Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. 
D.B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), 143. 
For a commentary on this topic, see Françoise Dastur, Telling Time, 
Sketch of a Phenomenological Chronology, trans. E. Bullard (London: 
Athlone Press, 2000), 13 and 105 nn. 43 and 44.
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of remaining constant and therefore recognizable by all as 
something lovely and positive?
As its etymology clearly states: ‘positivity’ means what is 
placed or what occupies place (ponere) and yet this ‘occupancy’ 
takes place without a clear indication of placement, location, 
or position. It capriciously posits itself without adopting a fi nal 
position, let alone a fi nal disposition. In this way, this neuter 
positively places itself as it de-places itself. Th is does not mean 
that it is just a frustrating protean ghost. Th is simply means 
that in order to ‘be,’ the neuter almost never ceases to visibly 
show itself in order to remain at the cusp of visibility. Even the 
negation of the neuter exscribes26 itself in the process; hence 
the fact that it is a positivity that isn’t a power or a powerless-
ness, a potency or an impotence.27
Th is neuter is therefore not ‘what exists’ here and now. 
Complex, the neuter is messy and messes around; it misses 
a step and yet still manages to step in time. As such, it can 
never be reduced to a single signifying and reductive term 
(‘life,’ for example), copula (‘be,’ for example) or, as we have 
26 I use again here Jean-Luc Nancy’s famous word in order to emphasize 
how this positivity works. However, the use of such a word is always 
made with Nancy’s careful warning: “‘Exscribe’ is not a word in our 
language, and one cannot invent it (as I have done here) and remain 
unscathed by its barbarism. Th e word ‘exscribed’ exscribes nothing 
and writes nothing; it makes a clumsy gesture to indicate what can 
only be written, in the always uncertain thought of language”: Nancy, 
Th e Birth to Presence, 339.
27 Again, the diffi  culty here is to think a positive dispersal that is not 
pitched against a negative one. Th e use of the word ‘positivity’ there-
fore necessitates a situation in which the antagonisms (sex, gender, 
etc.) are already in play. Positivity thus becomes what sustains the 
antagonisms or oppositions as if the very condition of their existence. 
As such, the neuter’s positivity is that which constitutes the divides 
positive/negative, masculine/feminine, etc., but without the possibility 
of ‘a backwards glance’ because it is an unpredictable surge that 
knows no tide, earth, or moon. For an analysis of these problems, see 
Peggy Kamuf, “Derrida and Gender: the Other Sexual Diff erence,” in 
Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially 100–4.
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seen, a standard operational device for existence (‘Dasein,’ 
for example); one that would give meaning or direction to the 
economy of subjects and objects, me, you, it, they. Th is neuter 
maddeningly smudges and disarranges copulas, correlations, 
and clever devices mercurially remaining at their cusp.
In this way, even in its own complex disarray, this neuter 
still evokes a movement, but this movement is not as straight-
forward as it seems. Because it coincides with the ‘origin’ of 
space and time, because it fuses itself with a concrete sexed and 
gendered bodily reality, this neuter is really—however odd this 
sounds—the positive ‘not yet’ of factual dispersion. Th is ‘not 
yet’ is not what can be recognized as coming but isn’t here yet. 
Th is ‘not yet’ is also not a pregnancy, potentiality, or futurity 
and however odd this sounds, the ‘not’ in this positive ‘not yet’ 
relates to no negativity or radicality. It simply marks the way 
the body goes about to positively disperse itself—we will come 
back to this. For the moment, let us simply say that the neuter 
as the positive ‘not yet’ of factual dispersion is really a complex 
bestrewal without surface. Th ere would be no man (and more 
generally no body) lying there in the sun without it.
2. Sexual Dif ference
introduction
Dispersing, I become a sexed body. Th e ‘sexed’ in question here 
only concerns the body ‘prior’ to its forced classifi cation into 
a bio-anthropological or ontic determination (male, man, for 
example). Once again, this ‘prior’ is neither chronological nor 
logical. A sexed body simply refers to a body that has at least ‘a’ 
sex. Whether I recognize it (and therefore use it) or not is here 
as yet to be determined.
Similarly, the ‘I’ referred to here is not yet an entity 
recognizable as such; it is only a random number of indefi nite 
disseminations surprisingly arriving at multiple points at the 
same time to say ‘you.’28 No specifi c unity, whether empirical, 
subjectal, or nominal, can be identifi ed here. Th e saying in 
question is simply a puzzling happenstance that language only 
manages to recognize with an inadequate and reductive ‘I.’29
28 Th is is a reformulation of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s famous 
sentence in: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Love Me, Love My Ombre, 
Elle,” Diacritics 14, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 28.
29 As Rosi Braidotti rightly says, “Th e power of synthesis of the ‘I’ 
is a grammatical necessity, a theoretical fi ction that holds together 
the collection of diff ering layers, the integrated fragments of the 
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As this dispersing sexed body, ‘I’ experience something 
unprecedented: a caress. Th is caress is not masturbatory yet. 
Th e hand hasn’t reached the erection; the mind is still else-
where. Th is caress is that taking place between parts of the 
body: a bicep by the ribcage or an open hand peacefully resting 
on a breathing stomach, for example. 
How am I to understand this event that necessarily 
involves a sexed body but occurs ‘before’ language determines 
its gendered performance and sexuality takes hold of its phan-
tasmagorical grip? Th is will be the topic of this next step in the 
exploration of this particular masculinity.
Please note: the following text makes a distinction between 
sexual diff erence and the diff erence of sexes. While the latter 
emphasizes a bio-anthropological opposition (man/woman, 
for example), the former highlights an indefi nite number of 
sexes all taking place in one body and, specifi cally here, in this 
dispersing sexed30 body. In this way, there will be in this chapter 
no reference to the classical diff erence that biological sex and 
socio-cultural   gender always entails, but to an arrangement31 
ever-receding horizon of my identity”: Rosi Braidotti, “Th e Politics of 
Ontological Diff erence,” in Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Teresa Brennan (London: Routledge, 1993), 93.
30 Because we are here ‘prior’ to the forced classifi cation of man into 
a distinctive bio-anthropological or ontic determination, the non-
bio-logical noun ‘sex’ or adjective ‘sexed’ can therefore only be under-
stood with split or open words like, for example: im-proper (never 
quite mine), im-pure (never quite clean), or in-decent (never quite 
honourable). Th ese words are more or less detached from a biological 
referent and yet remain at the cusp of intelligibility, that is, necessarily 
and as this body never tires to remind me, a-logical.
31 I use the term arrangement and not assemblage in order to avoid the 
kinds of (Deleuzian) assemblages put forward, for example, by Jasbi 
K. Puar. Th e reason I prefer arrangement to assemblage is because it 
allow for ‘what cannot be known, seen or heard’ (to use Puar’s words) 
to come and disrupt it: i.e. make a mess of the arrangement. Th e worry 
I have with Puar’s assemblage is that ‘what cannot be known, seen or 
heard’ must be incorporated within the assemblage as yet another 
‘network’ thus running the risk of creating a new totalizing narrative 
ultimately called a (Deleuzian) assemblage. With arrangement, my 
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known as sexual diff erence, an arrangement that, as will 
become clear, only a caress can make sense of.32 
As will be explored, this arrangement is conceived following 
the work of at least one author: Emmanuel Levinas and one 
of his most careful readers: Catherine Chalier. Th e reason for 
this choice is as follows: When it comes to sexual diff erence 
aim is to think how ‘what cannot be known, seen or heard’ actually 
de-structures the issue without necessarily appropriating it as part of 
the structure. Furthermore, to think this should avoid easily going from 
‘being’ to ‘becoming(s)’ and thus remaining stuck within a Deleuzian 
paradigm that, ultimately, only displaces the problem without taking 
the law of absolute heteronomy seriously enough. Th is law—and here 
I can only go against Puar’s argument—does not bring forth waves 
of the future breaking into the present. To say that it does can only 
eff ectively reassert and reinvigorate the singularity and dominance of 
the ‘I’ that Puar so forcefully rejects because, as always, this very ‘I’ 
remains secretly conceived as being stronger than time and thus able 
‘to see’—with Puar in tow—how the “future break into the present.” 
For Puar’s thought-provoking essay, see: Jasbir K. Puar, “Queer Times, 
Queer Assemblages,” Social Text 23, nos. 3–4 (Autumn-Winter 2005): 
121–39.
32 As it must be self-evident by now (and as it will become clear later on 
in this chapter with terms such as arrangement, impropriety, perpen-
dicular dislocation, and irretrievable remainder), the event sought 
here under the heading ‘Sexual Diff erence’ cannot be understood 
as an a-priori transcendental abstraction detached from concrete 
bio-ontical sexual realities. Although it occurs ‘prior to’ the diff erence 
of sexes, the event of sexual diff erence cannot be seen to found the 
diff erence of sexes. Conversely, although the diff erence of sexes 
happens ‘aft er’ sexual diff erence, it cannot be seen to result from it. In 
a situation where there is no formal logic, there can be no hierarchy 
or order of priority (temporal or otherwise). Sexual diff erence is 
not an empty fl oating signifi er and the diff erence of sexes is not its 
concrete content. Th e two necessarily contaminate each other without 
altogether forming a couple as such. No understanding of the body can 
take place outside of all abstraction and vice versa: no abstraction can 
take place detached from its concrete (or bodily) origin. For a fruitful 
discussion on this topic see the conversation that took place between 
Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, in Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left  (London: 
Verso, 2000), especially Butler, 144–8, Laclau, 190–2, and Zizek, 256–8.
32 |  T h e  E n d  o f  M a n
(and not the diff erence of sexes), Derrida leaves us with an 
unruly but unsatisfactory “choreography of sexual voices.”33 
It is unsatisfactory, because it never deals with the dynamics 
of the choreography. Who hears what and how in this dance? 
Re-reading Levinas helps us to see that this choreography is 
in fact structured as—and this is precisely what will remain 
to be shown in this chapter—a perpendicular dislocation that 
knows no rest. 
Please also note that the following chapter does not pretend 
to put forward yet another general theory of sexual diff erence 
for the human race.34 As should be clear by now, the sexual 
diff erence in question here is only that of this sexed body 
lying here on the ground. Any generalisation taken out of the 
following descriptions can only betray its specifi city and, as is 
well known, can only be disloyal to its own fabulation.35 
33 “I have felt the necessity for a chorus, for a choreographic text with 
polysexual signatures.… Th e relationship would not be a-sexual, far 
from it, but would be sexual otherwise: beyond the binary diff erence 
that governs the decorum of all codes, beyond the opposition feminine/
masculine, beyond bi-sexuality as well, beyond ‘homosexuality’ and 
‘heterosexuality’ which come to the same thing. As I dream of saving 
the chance that this question off ers I would like to believe in the 
multiplicity of sexually marked voices”: Derrida “Choreographies,” 76.
34 And for this reason, I will therefore shamelessly refrain from 
thinking this bio-graphy in relation to the animal realm. Th e reason 
for such shamelessness (cette pudeur to recall Derrida’s cat) is to 
prevent any attempt to think ‘beyond’ oppositional binaries (man-
woman, human-animal) because, as is well known, such attempt can 
only lead us either back to the same (man, for example) or into an 
unwieldy infi nite plurality. Oppositional binaries need to be thought 
otherwise and this is what is attempted here. For how sexual diff erence 
relates to animal diff erence see: Jacques Derrida, Th e Animal Th at 
Th erefore I Am [More to Follow], trans. D. Wills, Critical Inquiry 28, 
no. 2 (2002): 369–418. For a commentary on such a relation, see Kelly 
Oliver, “Sexual Diff erence, Animal Diff erence: Derrida and Diff erence 
Worthy of its Name,” Hypatia 24, no. 2 (Spring, 2009): 290–312.
35 As Jacques Derrida says: “If I were to say ‘sexual diff erence is a fable,’ 
the copula ‘is’ would permit the proposition to be turned around: a 
fable, thus every fable, is sexual diff erence, which can be understood 
in many ways. We can say that every fabulous narrative recounts 
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masculine-feminine
As is well known, sexual diff erence, like the neuter, must be 
thought outside of any form of opposition. When sexual 
diff erence is determined by opposition in the dialectical 
sense, there is no choice, but to misinterpret sexual diff erence, 
confuse it with the diff erence of sexes, and set off  once again the 
famous war between the sexes thus inevitably precipitating the 
end with a victory going to the male sex and men in general.36
In this way, the terms ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ are not 
used here in a way that is reducible to a member of the male 
or female sex. In other words, the feminine does not equate to 
woman and the masculine does not equate to man. However 
much this will infuriate those who cannot open the word 
bio-logy, the terms masculine and feminine will be used here 
as logical improprieties within the positive neuter of this body. 
An impropriety is simply what never accords with itself: being 
masculine is never my own and yet I recognize my masculinity. 
When I was a child, I had long hippy hair and people oft en 
thought that I was a girl. Even when I was an adolescent, when 
I more consciously opted for long hair, I was also deemed to 
be more feminine than masculine. I lacked virile qualities. 
Th is didn’t annoy me; it simply puzzled me. Even then, I 
thought that whoever or whatever I was, I could only be an 
odd juxtaposition of masculine and feminine. 
sexual diff erence, stages it, teaches it or off ers it for interpretation; or 
that ‘fable,’ that is to say, speech or parable, is all of sexual diff erence. 
Sexual diff erence, if there were such a thing, would be fabulous. Th ere 
would be no speech, no word, no talking that would not say and would 
not be and would not institute or would not translate something like 
sexual diff erence, this fabulous sexual diff erence. And there would be 
no sexual diff erence that would not go through speech, thus through 
the word fable”: Jacques Derrida, “Fourmis: Lectures de la diff érence 
sexuelle,” trans. E. Prenowitz, in Rootprints: Memory and Life Writing, 
ed. Hélène Cixous and Mireille Calle-Gruber (London: Routledge, 
1997), 120.
36 See Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. J.P. Leavey, Jr. and R. Rand (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1986), especially 4–5. See also Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, “Glas-piece,” Diacritics 7, no. 3 (1977): 22–45.
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Now that I have grown up, I realise that the masculine ‘in 
me’ is not due to the possession of a penis, but that it is a way of 
ap-propriating my‘self ’ and ultimately has nothing to do with 
sexuality or gender. Th e feminine ‘in me’ de-propriates37 such 
foolish attempt at property with as much force or strength 
as that expressed by my masculinity. Th e play between the 
two occurs not as a fi ght between opposite forces, but as the 
necessity of being both, that is, improperly complex. 
In this way, and as will become clear, a) the masculine and 
the feminine are not single and autonomous regions or aspects 
of the body, b) they do not come in sequence, c) they do not obey 
an order of priority, and d) they are not equal or comparable 
entities. As previously stated, the masculine and the feminine 
are here understood as an arrangement of improprieties that 
this specifi c body could never ap-propriate/de-propriate fully 
or with any clarity.38
Sexual diff erence is therefore not to be thought of as a 
straightforward opposition or hierarchy between masculine 
and feminine or between the active mastery of a subject and 
its passive submission, but rather as the necessity of having to 
be a ‘sexed’ body with all the various improprieties (mascu-
line, feminine, etc.) that structure it and dispute for attention. 
In other words, sexual diff erence is the necessity of being a 
‘sexed’ body in a situation where the word ‘sex’ always already 
remains to be invented.
37 I transform here Heidegger’s noun ‘de-propriation’ and make it into 
a verb: ‘to de-propriate.’ Th e verb does not exactly designate the self-
withdrawal of being (Enteignung), but the precipitous action of desta-
bilizing being. For Heidegger’s noun, see: Martin Heidegger, On Being 
and Time, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002), 23.
38 I thereby adhere here to Derrida’s understanding of sexual 
diff erence: “If ‘sexual diff erence is to be interpreted, to be deciphered, 
to be decoded, to be read, it cannot be seen. Readable, thus invisible, 
the object of testimony and not of proof—and in the same stroke 
problematic, mobile, not assured”: Derrida, “Fourmis,” 121.
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ecstasy
Th e necessity of having to be a ‘sexed’ body (participating as 
the masculine and the feminine before these are transformed 
into opposed bio-anthropological entities) implies empha-
sizing an enigmatic bodily advent: the ecstasy (of) spacing 
(and) temporizing that structures this sexed body.39
At the heart or on the surface of this sexed body, there is 
a sexual diff erence that never ceases to be diff erent and this 
whatever ‘I’ think and whatever ‘I’ do. Th is sexual diff erence is 
always already to-come and therefore necessarily on the edge 
of representation. As such, and however much two terms are 
used (masculine, feminine) sexual diff erence is, as previously 
stated, without recourse to formal logic or order, for it is always 
futural—hence the fact that it is an impropriety.
However, this sexual diff erence does not imply that there 
is ‘something’ autonomous that is recognizable as such: ‘my 
(always renewed) sexual diff erence,’ for example. Th e lack 
of referent means that sexual diff erence cannot be under-
stood within the prism of a synchronic ‘moment.’ If this were 
possible, then I would automatically reduce ‘it’ to an instant 
(a longish second that would allow me to gather my thoughts 
and write a phrase, for example) through which I would recog-
nize myself as either this or that; a recognition that would take 
place within a teleological order where the masculine would 
inevitably come fi rst and the feminine last.
In order for it to escape logic properly, the sexual diff erence 
of this body cannot be ‘a moment’ in space and  time. Th e 
absolute heteronomy (or diachrony40) that dislocates space 
39 Although the following draws its inspiration from the remarkable 
work of Catherine Chalier, it also attempts to gently depart from it. 
Th e aim of doing so is to simply rethink the relation with the radically 
other, a relation that remains in Chalier’s reading of Levinas still 
untainted by language. For Chalier’s main argument on this topic, see: 
Catherine Chalier, “L’Extase du Temps,” in Figures du Feminin (Paris: 
Des Femmes: Antoinette Fouque, 2006), 137–70.
40 I use here the word diachrony as a substitute for this law of absolute 
heteronomy and as a contrast to synchrony. Synchrony reduces time 
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and time also dislocates sexual diff erence. Inversely, sexual 
diff erence is what breaks space and time apart, a breaking that 
can never be understood as a breakage. In other words, sexual 
diff erence is the body falling out of phase with its sex, ‘just as’ 
spacing (and) temporizing disjoins space and time.41
But, if this is the case, then how can this diachronic 
sexual diff erence that appears to structure my sexed body be 
envisaged, let alone translated into words neatly arranged on 
this page? In other words, how can sexual diff erence be under-
stood without glossing over its radical ‘entanglement’ with 
the law of absolute heteronomy? Let me return and expand 
on the positive ‘not yet’ of factual dispersion mentioned in the 
preceding chapter on the neuter. Th is return and expansion 
will unreasonably fl irt with bodily allusions, but these, as will 
be shown, should never be taken literally.
to space and always ends up with a conception of time and space 
that is measured and homogeneous: an (in)fi nite series of punc-
tual moments spread along the axes of past (present) and future, for 
example. Synchrony is the time of the Said to use Levinas’s vocabulary. 
By contrast, diachrony is, as we have seen in the Introduction with 
regards to heterogeneous time, what breaks time and space apart. 
It is the falling out of phase with itself. Diachrony is the time of the 
Saying. Th e contrast created between synchrony and diachrony does 
not however exclude ana-chrony, which is what is without founda-
tion or origin. For a concise analysis of these issues see: Emmanuel 
Levinas, “Jacques Derrida: Wholly Otherwise,” in Proper Names, trans. 
M. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 59.
41 Th is can be extended—an extension that I deliberately avoid doing 
here in order to limit the scope—to the entry of the subject as a breaker 
of space (and) time. Joan Copjec explores this quite remarkably in her 
essay “Th e Sexual Compact.” She writes, for example: “Th e crucial 
point is this: Freud gives sexuality the same structure that he gives to 
the temporality of psychic functioning. Th is relation is not founded on 
mere analogy; neither term—time or sex—has priority over the other. 
Th e two are co-originary. Th e subject is sexuated inasmuch as she is 
fi nite, subject to time. Or: sex belongs not to the essence of the subject 
but to her historicity; it defi nes her life of pleasure/unpleasure inas-
much as she is fi nite, subject to time’s vicissitudes”: Joan Copjec, “Th e 
Sexual Compact,” Angelaki: Journal of the Th eoretical Humanities 17, 
no. 2 (2012): 37.
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‘between’
Dispersion necessarily implies horizontality, a spreading or a 
distribution over a period of space and time. As such, it is also 
a deployment of language. As a deployment, it is essentially 
masculine, it disseminates, it is seminal, it has something to 
do with emissions, which are also forms of emptying. Th is 
does not equate language with being male or a man. When the 
masculine is understood as an impropriety ‘within’ the positive 
neuter of this ‘sexed’ body, the deployment of language knows 
no gender. 
Sliding down perpendicularly,42 dispersion also implies 
verticality, a fact that creates intervals and therefore allows for 
the deployment. As such, it is also a disruption of language. 
As a disruption, it is essentially feminine; it falls or descends 
thus marking space and time, which is also a way of creating 
the world. As such, it has something to do with cycles, which 
are also forms of timely uncertainties. Once again, this does 
not equate the disruption of language with being female or a 
woman. Similarly, this feminine disruption of language knows 
no gender.
42 I have no competence here to link or relate this perpendicular 
structure to that envisaged by scientists (for example, that developed by 
Hermann Minkowski and later by Albert Einstein). Th e idea of perpen-
dicularity simply comes from reading a passing remark in Eberhard 
Gruber’s text on Levinas’s understanding of sexuality: “Autrement 
que sexuellement marqué? Lecture d’Emmanuel Levinas,” Literature 
142 (June 2006): 57, my translation: “What does then Levinas under-
stand by ‘relationship’? He perceives it as a temporal crisscrossing: the 
time that ‘splits the terms of the relation’ is subordinated to diachronic 
time. One could judge the feminine as being far too close to reality to 
signify the (human) condition of withdrawal, this symbolic charge that 
is usually understood as masculine because unable to give birth. But 
what matters is that this logical thinking of the withdrawal … is that of 
a diachronic thinking, which allows one to situate the masculine and 
the feminine not in opposition or in complementarity, but in a perpen-
dicular relation. Th e vertical line would be what is ‘before,’ while the 
horizontal line highlights a ‘succession.’’’ 
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Th is intervallic fall and this interrupted deployment create 
a kind of ‘between’ spacing (and) temporizing that can never 
be identifi ed, measured, or weighed. Th is ‘between’ is neither 
a juncture (an ‘and’ that can be heard), nor, more metaphori-
cally, the place of bisexuality or hermaphrodism, for example. 
Th is ‘between’ is a rapport of horizontality and verticality that 
never manages to report back, let alone make sense as such. If 
it did, then it would be nothing other than a fold created by 
divine agency. Instead, it is the ‘between’ birth and death, the 
union-separation43 involved in any happenstance. 
Th is ‘between’ obviously takes place ‘aft er’ the neuter, 
but still before any spatial or temporal and therefore ‘before’ 
any bio-anthropo-logical and historical determination. Once 
again, ‘before’ and ‘aft er’ do not refer here to an order of 
priority. Th is ‘between’ occurs ‘before,’ that is, it ‘carries’ (itself 
with) the factuality of being male or female, a man or woman. 
As such, it can never be understood as a negative force. Of the 
same order as the neuter, the ‘between’ created by this vertical 
slide and this horizontal deployment can never be rendered 
dialectical, be sublated, or deconstructed because it always 
evades a fi xed point from which this could happen. 
43 I follow here Nancy’s work, albeit with a slight divergence. Ian James 
provides the clearest summary of Nancy’s understanding of the body 
when he writes: “[Nancy’s] thinking of the corporeal as an event at the 
limit of sense, as an opening or spacing of discrete places, is seen in 
terms of a rupturing or fracture, or what Nancy will call an ‘eff raction,’ 
within two types of continuity, that of sense and that of matter.” Nancy’s 
rupturing, fracture, or eff raction is close to the ‘between,’ ‘union-sepa-
ration,’ or ‘logical absurdity’ that I develop in this book (and in Aft er 
‘Rwanda’). However, unlike Nancy, I situate this eff raction not ‘within’ 
the historical continuity of sense and matter, but right in the spacing 
(and) temporizing that provokes the historical event of sense and 
matter. For James’s quote, see: Ian James, Th e Fragmentary Demand: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 131.
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a perpendicular dislocation
Th e crucial aspect of this ‘between’ ‘prior’ to measured 
space and time is that it allows one to situate the masculine 
and the feminine not in opposition or complementarily, but 
in a perpendicular dislocation in which the masculine and 
the feminine dislocate themselves ‘just as’ spacing (and) 
temporizing disjoin space and time.
Th is perpendicular dislocation knows no co- (and as such 
cannot be seen as a correlation) that would form a secret 
commonality or ‘togetherness’ between the masculine and the 
feminine or a subject and object, for example. What is perpen-
dicular never forms ‘two.’ Th e fracture brought on by absolute 
heteronomy can know no relation. If it did, one would be in a 
synchronic moment, that is, at a specifi c moment in space and 
time, relating this and that together.
Th is perpendicular dislocation can therefore never be 
seen as that which is connected, associated, tied-up, or joined 
together. It is perpendicular because, like diachrony, it is the 
spacing (and) temporizing of that which occupies space and 
time, without ever letting itself be recognized as an ‘expression’ 
of spacing and/or temporizing, for example.
Th e fortunate or tragic aspect of this perpendicular dislo-
cation is indeed the fact that it can never be recuperated by 
memory or history (and thus forced into a dialectical relation 
productive of narratives and myths like that affl  icting poor 
Oedipus and Electra). Th e dislocation of the masculine and 
the feminine occurs every second of time anew, strange, unex-
pected, vexatiously alienating: the evermore-unexpected ruin 
of memory and history.
Although two improprieties have been singled out here 
(masculine, feminine), these are not exclusive or representative 
of sexual diff erence. Others, subtler, more imaginative, or 
simply to-come could have been chosen to expose such a 
perpendicular and always futural dislocation. Sexual diff erence 
is not a given; dislocation always lies ahead (if it really were 
given, one would have a relation of dislocated ‘items’ fl oating 
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in space and time, and no one would want that and this, even 
if, clarity is the least of our concerns).
an irretrievable remainder
However, notwithstanding the empirical indistinguishability 
between spacing (and) temporizing and sexual diff erence, 
there appears to be a transcendental distinction between the 
two. Th is distinction is the fact that unlike diachrony ‘as such,’ 
sexual diff erence can only be an irretrievable remainder44: 
what remains of diachrony—qua diachrony. 
Once again, this remainder precedes measurable space and 
linear time and therefore is allergic to memory and history. 
Before the subject, before the diff erence of sexes understood 
as male and female, man and woman, this remainder traverses 
this positive neuter body without ever being or becoming a 
remnant, appendage, protuberance, or prosthesis that can 
then be translated as an identity, an essence, or excrescence 
to the body. 
Th is remainder makes thought go on endlessly and will 
never allow itself to be thought out properly. It is that which 
is always already on the fore front of this mind but never 
lets itself be grasped or fi gured, not even before sex (being 
horny, for example) and certainly not aft er an orgasm (being 
alleviated and elated, for example). Like the dislocation of 
space and time, the remainder or sexual diff erence can never 
stop or be stopped and this, even when in a coma or in the 
grips of senility.
44 Th is irretrievable remainder echoes Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation 
of the sexual as the supernumerary or surplus of the body. However, 
although it echoes this interpretation, it also divests itself from it 
because the remainder of this chapter stays with sexual diff erence and 
not the diff erence of sexes. For Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation see: 
Jean-Luc Nancy, 58 Indices sur le corps et Extension de l’âme (Quebec: 
Nota Bene, 2004), 66 and Ginette Michaud’s commentary on this 
surplus in “Appendice,” 85–122, especially, 110–16. Th e translation of 
Nancy’s text can be found in Nancy, Corpus, 160.
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substitutability and the unexpected
Th e curious thing about this remainder or sexual diff erence 
is that it cannot be understood, as Catherine Malabou rightly 
observes, outside of substitutability.45 Th e masculine, the 
feminine, or any other impropriety can change from one 
into the other at any time. Th is does not mean that within 
the body they remain the same and swap places occasionally. 
Substitutability does not mean replacement. Improprieties 
have no ability to fi x themselves in space and time. Th ere 
would be no ‘between’ without substitution.
However, this is not a self-contained or self-enclosed 
system that would perpetually modify itself as if some ever-
malleable self-contained plastic toy or inventive drag queen or 
king. Absolute heteronomy plays a curious part in this substi-
tutability: it indeed digs out the spacing (and) temporizing in 
question here, right in the fl esh of diff erence. Th is crucial role 
avoids treating the masculine and the feminine as general and 
generic forces locked in a mutual embrace or at war. Absolute 
heteronomy disrupts the game, always making an opening for 
the event or the performance of any one of these improprieties. 
Inevitably, in the same way that sexual diff erence is allergic 
to synchronic grammar, it also cannot be regulated by any 
kind of subjective, objective, natural, or civil law. At the mercy 
of absolute heteronomy and a player in this very heteronomy, 
this substitutability expresses the positive madness of sexual 
diff erence. It is ‘mad’ because resolutely out of control and this 
whether I live the recluse life of an abstinent monk or spend 
my time getting drunk, shagging, and/or cross-dressing.
45 I follow here Catherine Malabou. However, as the next paragraph 
shows, I slightly alter her interpretation of substitutability, thus 
making it less Hegelian. For Malabou’s remarkable observation about 
substitutability, see: Catherine Malabou, Changing Diff erence: Th e 
Feminist and the Question of Philosophy, trans. C. Shread (London: 
Polity, 2011), 37.
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caress-before-touch
And this is how I happen to caress myself, lying there half-
asleep, in a slumber. My bicep touches my side. My hand 
rests on my downy stomach. Such contacts express a myriad 
of diff erent modes of othering my sex, the remainder of the 
ecstasy (of) spacing (and) temporizing. Neither strictly 
masculine nor feminine, my male body caresses itself; thus 
breaking space and time: digging out or opening up a new or 
unfamiliar impropriety.
At no point can I pin down a moment in this caress. It 
always leads me to another moment, another repose open to 
the contingent. In the grips of heterogeneous time, this para-
doxically controlled and uncontrolled ‘movement’ has no 
specifi c sexual attributes (a typically male kind of stroke, for 
example). It leads me astray without altogether getting me lost.
As such, this caress cannot fall under the sense of touch, 
contact, or sensation, which will be explored in the last chapter 
of this book within the context of the diff erence of sexes. What 
is caressed here is really not touched.46 A movement that 
carries itself out is beyond the realm of the senses because it is 
necessarily futural: it does not know where it is going and as 
such marks the dusk of being, the ebb of knowledge, the wane 
of light. 
In this way, the caress in question here can only be a 
movement of exteriorization that cannot be gathered, a move-
ment that exceeds itself without there being an inside or an 
outside to this excess: blind experience. Th e bicep and the 
hand are still. Th e two exceed themselves beyond their very 
46 I obviously borrow this idea from Levinas. However, unlike Levinas 
and aft er him Derrida, I deliberately refrain form confusing this type 
of caress with that taking place in the context of the diff erence of sexes. 
In other words, Eros here is not yet awake. On this familiar Levinasian 
theme, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infi nity: An Essay on 
Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1969), especially 260–1; and Derrida’s reading of Levinas’s Time and 
the Other in Jacques Derrida, On Touching Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. C. 
Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 77 and n. 17.
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singularity, right at the moment when the body abandons its 
mastery, recedes from being-able and shivers or shimmers 
with unforeseeable possibilities.
In this way, this caress or excess awakes a sexual diff erence 
that no new caress or excess can appease. No shift  of the body, 
no move of the hand can bring any sense or relief to this sexual 
diff erence. In its stillness, this sexed body thus remains open 
to a new event, a new mode of being or tendency—the unex-
pected breaking apart of space and time, a spacing (and) 
temporizing that never aff ords a pause or a poised attitude.
Th is positive madness of sexual diff erence—which allows 
for this substitutability between the masculine and the 
feminine or any (other) improper perpendicular dislocation—
rules this caress. It is a ruling without power or authority and 
yet, however contradictory this sounds, always already in 
the hands of a conscious decision: remaining horizontal, not 
moving, in a slumber. 
Th e crucial aspect of this madness is that it is really the 
only thing that allows me to evade the overwhelming violence 
of indistinctiveness that being ‘me’ here on this simple straw 
mat implies. In other words, the caress provokes in me a 
forgetting of being, that is, a letting-go of the weight and the 
horror of being reducible to just ‘one,’ ‘male,’ ‘a man’ (even if 
this ‘one’ is always indefi nitely withdrawn further away). Th e 
ever-unfulfi lled or always renewed caress relieves me from 
these singular and autocratic confi nes. 
Th rough this forgetting of being, the caress therefore 
allows me to open a future that is diff erent from that of (my) 
death. We will come back to this. For the moment, let us say 
simply that my open hand peacefully resting on the hair on my 
stomach or my bicep gently touching my side implies a space 
and time other than that of my death; it intimates the other of 
the masculine, the feminine, or of any other impropriety; an 
other that no prediction or projection can possibly envisage. 
To caress is indeed to unsettle without ever mastering ‘it’ the 




He almost falls back to sleep.47 Th e ‘he’ in question here is the 
echo of the previous ‘I.’ A ‘he’ always comes aft er a fi rst person 
pronoun, once an ‘I’ is heard—which does not mean that this 
‘I’ has been recognized or identifi ed. ‘He’ is the pronoun of 
representations and narratives. At the risk of being accused 
of illeism, the ‘he’ in this chapter will echo the ‘I’ because 
representation is the only tool available to make sense of what 
cannot be talked about: my resting male body.48 
47 Suff ering from insomnia, sleep in this chapter will not refer to 
the state in which the nervous system is inactive and consciousness 
suspended, but to a state of drowsiness or somnolent watchfulness, the 
sense of being ‘there’ and yet unable to fully grasp what this ‘there’ 
actually means.
48 As Jean-Luc Nancy says, when I sleep, “I no longer properly 
distinguish myself from the world or from others, from my own body 
or form my mind either. For I can no longer hold anything as an object, 
as a perception or a thought, without this very thing making itself felt 
as being at the same time myself and something other than myself ”: 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Th e Fall of Sleep, trans. C. Mandell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 7.
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In his slumber, he is able to seek refuge from the never-
ending task of always attempting to compose himself, to 
take action, and being someone. In other words, with rest, 
he gives up the task of always seizing himself in order to fi ght 
for his place in the sun in this exiguous present that is never 
present enough, never accomplished, never totalised. His rest 
allows him a relief from this exhausting, and, alas, at times, 
violent task. 
Dozing off  is thus more than simple rest from alertness and 
war. Besides being a moment of recuperation, sleep, however 
light, is also the manifestation of a suspicion towards the limits 
that appear to structure him and his day. In other words, with 
a nap, the suspicion is expressed that the fi ght might not be 
entirely necessary, that the exiguity of the present might not be 
as real as it seems. Sleep is the suspicion of being.
However, even this refuge is not entirely peaceful. He 
drift s off  with the covert or blanketed knowledge that a hand 
will perhaps rouse him, even arouse him, thus forcing him 
to abandon his refuge and return to the laborious day-task 
of articulating and positioning himself in the world. He thus 
rests knowing that the suspicion of being is only temporary, 
that the violence of being knows no real refuge, except death. 
But this other hand isn’t there yet. In his or her temporary 
absence, this male body reveals himself in all its vulnerability. 
How is one to think this exhibition of maleness? If the mascu-
line—as previously defi ned—is the deployment of language, 
then how does this deployment manifests itself in this display 
of maleness and how does this male body relate to the femi-
nine interrupting him every second of time? Th ese will be the 
questions of this third chapter. 
Two main authors will help to address them. Th ese two 
authors are careful readers of Levinas, but who interestingly, 
diverge in their reading of his work: Catherine Chalier and 
Luce Irigaray. Th e latter arguably inaugurated the now classic 
reading of Levinas as a misogynous philosopher. Irigaray’s 
aim is to avoid not only reducing women to alter-egos of men, 
but also to alert to the danger in Levinas’s work of allowing the 
feminine to stand for alterity. Catherine Chalier, by contrast, 
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takes up this juxtaposition of alterity and the feminine in 
order to continue throwing into question the dominant 
masculine modes of thinking that permeates western philos-
ophy. For Chalier, the feminine as alterity, on the contrary, 
ruptures (male) ontological categories. Th e divergences are 
clear and the following text will attempt to negotiate them as 
(un-)faithfully as possible.
Please note that although the following chapter focuses 
on the male body, there will be only dangerously tangential 
references in what follows to the gender known as man as 
opposed to woman. Th e male body retains here as its intrinsic 
characteristic the fact that it is neuter and both masculine and 
feminine as previously defi ned. Male here means the incredu-
lity of being a man not because of an unwillingness to believe in 
the condition of being a man, but because of the impossibility 
of ascribing a property to what is called ‘man.’ 
Th e word ‘incredulity’ does not imply an event, like, for 
example, ‘He now doubts that he is a man.’ Incredulity ex-poses 
itself over time; it ex-hibits itself as a historical narrative 
without discernable beginning or end. In this way, his body 
ex-poses that it will ‘always already’ be incredulous that he 
is a man or that ‘man’ is indeed his property—or a property 
as such.
Please also note that some people will not recognize in what 
follows a male body. Th ose—men or women—who think that a 
male body is only truly representative if it comes in the shape 
of sweaty fi ghters, skilled action heroes, brave warriors, iron-
willed bodybuilders, or airbrushed supermodels will simply be 
disappointed. Th is is the male body, as it is not supposed to 
be seen.
the master
He is now resting and yet, when he will be fully awake, he 
will immediately fall into a cliché: however much he dislikes 
it, his body will stand for what society expects it to stand for: 
a male who, because he is male, necessarily masters language 
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(being strong, for example). He will be the one who in his body 
is ‘naturally’ unconstrained by language: the master, or so he 
will hope to be (and so does, when it is convenient, the rest of 
the human race). 
With such power and freedom, he will take his body to work. 
At work, his body will use a language that constantly confi rms 
his stability and mastery. In the process, he will further 
stabilize his body by associating himself with other terms such 
as vigour, power, potential, virility, phallus, authority, etc. He’s 
all guts and balls, changing his life, changing the world, for 
good or worse—more oft en than not, for good and worse. 
Something else will also happen: while looking, his body 
will conquer and objectify (he apparently knows no other way 
of looking: an unfortunate impediment of his sight). Th rough 
this taking and possessing, his body will thus becoming invis-
ible, un-representable. His body will be all eyes, objectifying 
the world from an unshakable seat of power: his ocular 
centrism, a position that knows no proper rival. 
However, having such a stable base and referent has a 
price: he cannot articulate his body otherwise than in relation 
to a scrutinized and projected (idealised or not) opposite: a 
fragile, feeble, or vulnerable body. In one word, his (‘invisible’) 
body will be dependent on what (‘visibly’) is not ‘pure-eyes’: a 
female body. He will indeed not only defi ne his body as this 
opposite, but he will also articulate his body in the necessary 
dependency of this opposite: he will be male because he desires 
and/or rejects female bodies, thus helping him being who he 
imagines he ought to be. 
Th is price has a curious consequence: however much he 
longs for independence, he can never achieve it. His body will 
always already be dependent on an other body (for example, 
the body of a feeble and mannered ubiquitous pooft er) who 
will also never be able to be independent. Th e chain of depen-
dency will always be infi nite. However much he hates it, his 
grasp of his body will remain always already shaky and indefi -
nite, never properly accomplished or perfectly hollowed out, 
never entirely asserted or erased.
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In this way, however much his body will struggle to be the 
master of language, this very body cannot allow him to be 
secure, the day-work will always have to be re-started, the fi ght 
for mastery will have to be directed, this time, against other 
bodies, other real or imaginary powers or weaknesses. Never, 
will his body allow him to escape the demands of being such a 
cliché (but then, maybe this is the fate of all bodies). 
Th is is not a defeatist thought: ‘boys will be boys,’ or ‘he’s 
just a bloke, really’—thus vindicating the cliché. Th is simply 
means that however much the pressure is on, the grasp of the 
male body is always already uncertain. Th e cliché is never 
always properly accomplished. Th e fi ght thankfully never 
always properly won. (What always needs to be fought is the 
fall into the cliché, the abdication to the delusions created by 
biological fate.)
the sensible
And yet, here he is, lying there in the sun. His body is open to 
examination: He is passive, fragile, vulnerable, and exposed. 
Since he is outdoors, his skin is exposed to the fi ery sun, his 
body is vulnerable to the winds coming form the sea. Th ere is 
an over-abundance of exposed maleness here that is curiously 
ready for representation, that is, possession. 
As such, he is not quite the one who masterly represents; 
he is no longer the subject, the lord of theory and concepts, 
pure eyes. He is here, most simply, the sensible, a vulnerable 
signifi cant phenomena, a non-ideal chaos of corporeal being. 
As this sensual body, he is thus anterior to the violence of 
representation and to violence full stop: an unusual state for 
a male.
Currently failing in his task of trying to be the master, 
this male body cannot therefore present himself in terms of 
sameness and representation. He is not the self-present or the 
self-evident. Th is does not mean that, while he is suspicious of 
being, he is the outside of presence or the other of representa-
tion, for example. He is here simply, and in the most relaxed 
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manner possible, failing mastery. His supposed power over 
representation is here clearly lacking. 
However much he cannot escape properly the demands 
of being a cliché, this cliché paradoxically does not there-
fore always apply. Th is male body here has none of the attri-
butes usually associated with (virile) male bodies. He is here 
most simply an empirical beginning. While he will  never be 
maternal, he can at least be here matrical:49 he provides for 
representation; he is a gift  for representation. 
morphology
Here are a few recklessly chosen examples of how he can be a 
gift  for representation: 
First, inevitably (for where else can one start?), he has a 
penis (that joker50) and a scrotum. Th ese protuberances are 
49 Th ere is no space here to explore the theme of the matrix or the 
matrical as a (male) empirical beginning. Suffi  ce to say that the 
matrical is not understood here as something in space and therefore 
as something visibly attributable to women only. Th e matrical is the 
giving of space and time; a giving or providing that knows no gender 
strictly speaking. As such, I distance myself here from the remarkable 
work of Irina Aristarkhova who writes most eloquently on the theme 
of the matrix and the maternal. Th e reason I distance myself from 
this work is simply because the matrix or the matrical cannot for 
me be understood within a measured spatial and temporal frame-
work and consequently be limited to biological or cultural references. 
For more on this a-gendered matrix, see Jean-Paul Martinon, 
Aft er “Rwanda,” (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013), especially chapter 2, 
“Matrix - Akantu.” For Aristarkhova’s work, see Irina Aristarkhova, 
Hospitality of the Matrix: Philosophy, Biomedicine, and Culture 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), especially, chapter 2, 
“Materializing Hospitality.”
50 “When it comes to the naked male form, the penis is the joker: it is 
that which cannot be represented because of its ability to veer the repre-
sentation into pornography, it is what is improper to representation”: 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Federico Ferrari, Nus sommes (La peau des 
images) (Brussels: Yves Gevaert, 2002), 68, my translation.
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supposed to prove that a male body is not only invisible, but 
also, paradoxically, visible to itself. A man or a woman can look 
down and see that indeed he is male. Nothing is here hidden. 
All is in plain view, nothing evades representation; everything 
is morphologically emphatic.51 Nakedness never stares back.
Th is familiar interpretation of the male body, as that which 
is visible to itself, implies an absurd reduction of the male 
body: a monolithic and monologic economy with a few protu-
berances. As is well known, the male body is more than this 
apparent visibility, which at times gets hidden on a surgical 
table or under a roll of fat.
Second, the reversed myth that the male body is always 
already visible to itself obscures the fact that this male body 
lying here is also easily penetrable. He moves in his sleep 
and the between of his legs off ers a penetrability, which he 
himself cannot see. Th is is a contrary aperture, but an aper-
ture nonetheless, a darkness that easily bleeds at any violent 
intrusiveness.
Th is penetrability unexpectedly transforms the male body 
into a dwelling, a dangerous supplementary welcome par 
excellence. As such and however unusual this may sound; this 
male body becomes an open interiority that cannot be appro-
priated; a ‘hospitality’ before any form of sociality; a natural 
and yet contrary supplement—if one can say such a thing.
Finally, his obvious visibility clearly shows that his body is 
unable to bear children. Th is does not mean that he is infer-
tile. Th is simply means that he can never be two—we will come 
back to this. Th is confi nes him to this world of representation 
and to this endless struggle of mastery, the athletic and yet 
pathetic commonplace eff ort of being. 
51 As a radical counterpoint and as an inevitably unwise step aside into 
the realm of sexuality, see, for example, the persistent and problematic 
fi guration of lesbianism as unrepresentable, invisible, and impossible 
in Annamarie Jagose, Inconsequence: Lesbian Representation and the 
Logic of Sexual Sequence (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002).
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eschatology
His fertile and yet barren situation gives him an unusual 
attribute: he is eschatology itself; he is the end of man. Th is 
does not mean that he is a genetic dead-end or that he alone 
stands for eschatology, as if some symbolic walking end. He 
is the end because however much the feminine interrupts his 
body perpendicularly every second of time, his male body 
forces him to be above all the deployment that leads to the end. 
In other words, being ‘sexed,’ and his sex being male, 
gives him no other choice, but to embody the end. His bodily 
deployment ‘speaks’ of the end. Th is ‘speech’ is not an ability 
to express thoughts and feelings by articulate sounds. Th is 
‘speech’ is that expressed by his always-lonesome male body. 
If he didn’t have this mediating ‘speech,’ his body would be 
dead matter.
Although he can play at being the messiah and project into 
the future, he can never be properly messianic: he can never be 
the beginning of man, for example. He can only be messianic 
by proxy. Never ‘two,’ his male body simply prevents him from 
opening the future with another ‘one.’ Confi ned to distance, 
mediation, representation and therefore ends, he can only 
deploy the end—eschatology.
In this way, while the (fecund) female body tears 
humankind out of history with her children and therefore into 
a hereto-unheard future, this male body can only take himself 
and others into the future conceived teleologically, that is, as 
the outcome of accumulated past and future presents. Th is 
is his lonesome task: deploy for himself and others the end. 
In this way, this male body is simply—a simplicity that oft en 
pains him—the laborious fi nality of history.
Unable to give birth and therefore always an origin at 
a distance—a metaphorical distance for it can also be the 
sultriest of intimacies—his inextricable eschatological confi ne 
puts him in an always uncomfortable double bind: 
Firstly, his body is a call to fi ction. Th is call is directed 
to the female body and this whether he is ‘heterosexual,’ 
‘homosexual’ or ‘queer.’ Th e fact of the origin is unknown to 
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him because always already mediated, imagined, represented. 
Th is does not a) equate the female body with fi ction, b) elevate 
the female body over the male body, or c) give the female body 
a privileged knowledge; this is simply the recognition of an 
inevitable bodily call to fi ction about the facticity of origin. 
Secondly, his body is also a plea to women to extend himself 
beyond death. Never two, he (in most cases, a ‘heterosexual’ 
‘he’) longs to meet a woman who can give birth to ‘his’ child, 
a child that, at a distance, will take him, whether he likes it or 
not, somewhat beyond death. Once again, this does not elevate 
the female body or women in general as the sole provider 
of a life beyond fi nitude. Th is is simply the recognition of a 
lonesome plea to be taken out of eschatology.
Th is call to fi ction and, for some, this plea to women shows 
that although his body is condemned to be eschatological, he 
is not just for death; he is also for a beyond death. In other 
words, while his body can never tear mankind out of history, 
his eff orts at being the laborious fi nality of history is also 
paradoxically an eff ort to be (together) the laborious infi nity of 
history. Eschatology is never one-sided, providing, of course, 
one can recognize a side to eschatology.
no hero
Notwithstanding his oft en-aggressive pride in his maleness—
masculine deployment does not always translate well in 
the male body—he is thus an alienated being. Even his day-
time work will not be able to overcome this: He will always 
remain alienated not only by the ‘other’ (as un/defi ned in the 
Introduction) but also by the products he creates, these manly 
tools that always end up rising up against him, always untamed 
and hostile, mere symbols of his end of history. 
Even when he is seen (supposedly) mastering his existence 
and his products (the media bombard us enough with such 
delusory images), his eschatology still prevents him from 
being a hero. He can be no hero properly because death still 
holds him in its grip. Death indeed remains (even for him, who 
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stands for the end) a ‘never now,’ something that will always 
already evade his eschatological grasp. In front of the great 
reaper, he is eff ectively a weakling, like anybody else. 
Th e male body lying here in the aft ernoon sun is therefore 
clearly no hero because as soon as he will awake, he will 
always already hope not to die: death will simply come to him, 
eventually, the fi nal submission to time. And even if he plans 
to commit suicide, he will still be unable to master death; he 
will simply succumb to it because of his inability to carry over 
to the other side his mastery. 
the appeal to the feminine
Hence his never acknowledged appeal to the feminine, which 
here, in this context, is not a call to the female body as his 
eschatological salvation or a plea to woman as his bio-anthro-
pological opposite, the potential mother to ‘his’ child. Th is is 
a diff erent kind of appeal in comparison to the previous two 
because it is not, as we have seen, relational, but perpendicular.
As stated before, in (or all over) this male body lying here in 
a slumber, the feminine and the un-mediated future coincide in 
a coincidence that knows no incidence. In this way, his appeal 
to the feminine is an appeal to the future, to what comes from 
above, takes his breath away, and marks (and therefore allows 
for) his singular lonesome and fi nite deployment. How is one 
to understand this appeal (which is also, paradoxically, an 
appeal to self)?
In his intractable solitude, this male body fi nds himself 
bound to and by an indefi nite present. Within this present, he 
is breathless: he is always already trying to fi nd a solid base 
from which to assert himself. Unfortunately, however much 
he tries, he remains stuck precariously in this indefi nite, but 
fi nite present: between an inherited past that always eventually 
vanishes into the immemorial and an always-mediated future 
that always seems to come from nowhere. 
And so he turns, for want of a better solution, to what he 
thinks is the ‘instant present’: trying to live ‘it’ as much as 
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he can: young, working and partying hard, old, enjoying the 
moments that come knowing the end is near. In each case, 
he exposes an always failing sovereignty, a lack of mastery 
over a time that is never really his. Th is failing mastery is the 
only result possible when the instant present (past-present or 
future-present) is sought out.
Th e only way he might be able to overcome such failing 
is if he fi nally acknowledges his appeal to the feminine. Th e 
perpendicular fall of the feminine—this fall that gives him his 
confi ning present—is indeed the only ‘thing’ or the only ‘one’ 
that can allow him to escape the fatality that structures and 
overwhelms him in the present: his eschatology.
Unsurprisingly, the recognition of this appeal is not 
what will fi nally tame once and for all his endless propen-
sity to master himself. Th e acknowledgement of this appeal 
only allows him to relax a little, that is, to accept that his 
body is also this feminine fall that both makes possible and 
alleviates his end-game—a strange kind of acceptance, an 
odd taming of mastery because it is the exact opposite of 
becoming eff eminate.
To become eff eminate is indeed to dismiss the body’s 
eschatological confi ne; it is to pretend that a male body can 
potentially or momentarily open the future. While the act of 
becoming eff eminate is a valid endeavour; it unfortunately can 
never entirely overcome its limit: the end of man. Saying this 
does not imply calling for a return to an archaic virility, but 
for a sustained questioning of improprieties (masculine and 
feminine) all in the aim of taming mastery—and this, even if 
dresses are being worn.
Once a little tamed, he will then perhaps be able to stop 
grasping his body only to stupidly shatter it against death, 
haughty and proud: the vainglory achievements of man-folk. 
If this taming ever happens, then this male body will perhaps 
begin to take time to be against death, to postpone it, procras-
tinate, have patience. If this taming ever happens, then this 
male body will perhaps also begin to signify otherwise, that 
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is, at the same time, in an impossible simultaneity, otherwise 
than being52—a diffi  cult task that is far from being achieved. 
But hush, this male body is slowly stirring, turning over, 
progressively regaining consciousness, growing grumpier as 
he awakes: the need for mastery steadily clenching ‘its’ grip. 
Th is slow turn reveals his many sides, angular, hairy, robust, 
smelly, warm, delicate, graceful. An abyss in every crevice, a 
mass at every turn, this male body can reach neither a pleni-
tude of meaning nor a truly stable referent. His language, like 
his body, betrays him at every turn: never quite masculine, 
ever more virile/eff eminate, never enough feminine. 
52 Th e intention here is not to put forward an easy philosophical quip 
that would pretend to overcome in one single brushstroke Levinas’s 
outstanding argument in Otherwise than Being. Th e intention here 
has its roots in a previous book where the juxtaposition of the violent 
(male) ‘being otherwise’ and the ethical (feminine) ‘otherwise than 
being’ are analysed at length. See Aft er ‘Rwanda,’ particularly chapters 
5 and 6.
4. The Side Story
introduction
Th e story goes that he is a man and that he is profoundly 
asleep, that is, in a sleep that nothing, not even a knife to his 
side would awake. We do not yet know who this man is. One 
thing is certain: he defi nitely does not stand for humanity; he 
is just another man, maybe the wrong man. 
With this story comes a woman. Unlike he, who is fast 
asleep, she is awakening, slowly gaining awareness of her 
strange surroundings. We also do not know who this woman 
is. Maybe she stands for kindness, or maybe she is simply 
another woman. She too is perhaps the wrong woman. 
In the following chapter, there is a diff erence of tense. His 
side of the story is told in the past tense, while her side is more 
or less transcribed using the future anterior, this compound 
tense that consists of two verbs: an auxiliary verb in the 
future tense (‘will’) and a past participle verb (‘have read,’ for 
example). ‘More or less transcribed,’ because although facticity 
needs no explanation, language nearly always fails to tran-
scribe it, commentary always creeping in, unnecessary and 
yet, however annoying, unavoidable.
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In any case, the future anterior is the only tense available. 
Th ere would be no ‘side’ story (and therefore no fi ction in 
general), if it were not for this crucial temporal tense that 
expresses the im-possible factuality of the (living) present by 
gracefully resting on both past and future (‘will’ ‘have…’).53 
In other words, without this tense, that is, without the factual 
emphasis implied in this compound tense, there would be no 
fi ction, explanation, or commentary.
Th is chapter has two aims:
Th e fi rst one is to demonstrate—once more, can this be 
done enough times?—that the origin of all things has, contrary 
to Aristophanes54 and the authors of the Bible,55 neither an 
androgyne nor a lonely man as a starting point, but a couple56 
53 I follow here a well-known Derridean use of tense. As Simon 
Critchley explains: “Th e signifi cance of the future anterior is 
that it is a temporality irreducible to what Derrida would call the 
‘metaphysics of presence’ or what Levinas would call ‘ontology,’ and 
one which envisages a language that would escape the dominant 
interpretation”: Simon Critchley, Th e Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida 
and Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 115–6. 
See also, Diane Moira Duncan Th e Pre-Text of Ethics: On Derrida and 
Levinas (Bern: Peter Lang, 2001), 156.
54 Plato, Symposium, trans. W. Hamilton (London: Penguin, 
1951), 58–66.
55 Genesis 2:22–24.
56 Th e following is inspired by, but also departs from, a commentary 
by Jean-Luc Nancy in a series of notes written for a seminar at the 
University of Paris 8 on 28 January 2005 and subsequently published 
in Littérature. Th e commentary is as follows: “If one must wait for 
something out of the division of sex (this division of the one-being 
narrated in Aristophanes’ discourse in the Banquet) it would have to 
be that One (from which two supposedly appears) never really existed. 
Th e conclusion would be that the division would have always preceded 
it. And if this is the case, then there is never division or separation. Th e 
division is therefore the originary relation, the originary exposition, 
and this must also be understood as the original exposure itself: if 
the origin ‘is’ relation, then the origin dissipates itself in the relation”: 
Jean-Luc Nancy, “Et après,” Littérature 2, no. 142 (June 2006): 34, 
my translation.
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and that it is impossible to think about this masculinity, male 
body, and man without thinking this supposedly originary 
couple, which defi es all kinds of nostalgia for unity.57 
Th e second aim of this chapter is that this couple brings 
fact and fi ction together: a fi ction about an inversion of biolog-
ical truth and a biological fact that can only be expressed using 
the future anterior. Th e unusual aspect of this juxtaposition is 
that neither fi ction nor fact can be understood independently 
of each other.58 
Please note that his side of the story is told here fi rst. Th is 
does not show the usual disrespect or a contradiction in the 
57 Always desperate to dominate, always in need to control, aimlessly 
wondering alone in their own superiority, male readers of Luce 
Irigaray’s recent work (In the Beginning, She Was) can only be left  at 
once in awe and disturbed at her discourse. Th e End of Man will not 
be addressing the contents of Irigaray’s latest work. Th e reasons for not 
addressing this important late book is this: Although it takes 148 pages 
for Irigaray to admit that, she is “not a male person,” the whole book is 
structured on the basis of a gross generalization about men: what they 
are like, have always been, and presumably will always be. Women on 
the contrary are either (understandably) the victim of men’s oppressive 
language or (curiously) elevated to such a degree that it is no longer 
possible to diff erentiate between “she,” “the goddess,” and “Mother 
Nature”; the last holding men (and women) as if in a perpetual womb. 
Irigaray’s curiously phallic discourse relies heavily (however much 
she decries it) on an unfl inching Hegelian hetero-normative dialectic 
in which women and men are placed, without ambiguity, in radical 
opposition to each other, an opposition that ultimately can only 
be sublated when a self-aff ected, but mysteriously undefi ned “we” 
pops up (on the last page) fi nally recognizing its common origin in 
this all-encompassing “Mother Nature” (tsunamis and earthquakes 
presumably included). How does “Mother Nature” come about, is 
not explained, but “we” must allow her—or Her—to emerge in order 
to stop sexism, misogyny, and patriarchy. See Luce Irigaray, In the 
Beginning, She Was (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
58 Th is does not mean that fi ction and facticity are the necessary 
components of every reality or that they are eternal. Fiction is not 
necessarily fabrication. It is also invention. Facticity is not neces-
sarily a fact. It is also the possibility of disputation. In both cases, it is 
impossible to talk, as Meillassoux intimates, for example, of an implicit 
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chapter. Fiction can only come fi rst because this is her story. 
Consequently, the subsequent transcription of the fact can only 
be made here, by me, fraudulently. Th e relationship between 
hermeneutics and facticity can only indeed be fraudulent 
because a fact—and the fact of giving birth specifi cally—is not 
something that one can take cognizance of or have knowledge 
about, not even while holding the hand in a maternity ward. 
Facticity is an existential knowing.
Please also note that any similarity with fi ctitious or factual 
events or characters is purely coincidental. Th e reading of texts 
such as Th e Bible (especially Genesis 2:4-2:25), Mieke Bal’s 
“Sexuality, Sin, and Sorrow,” Daniel Boyarin’s “Th e Politics 
of Biblical Narratology,” and the texts of Phyllis Trible are 
not necessarily accurate. Following a Talmudic tradition that 
Levinas never tires to recall, what counts above all is not the 
truth of the texts examined, but their reading. Texts are not 
here to be studied as if dead matter, but in order to contribute 
to their message and this implies, in a gesture that can only be 
as respectful and faithful as possible, to create misreadings all 
in the hope of pushing things along and thus contributing to 
the Word. As Levinas says, pushing the argument way further: 
“the irreplaceable part that every person and every moment 
contribute to the message—or to the prescription itself—
which is received and whose wealth is thereby revealed only in 
the pluralism of persons and generations.”59
fiction
Once upon a time, there was a man lying down in a pool of 
sun, sleeping. Except for his sex, no specifi c features marked 
him out. He was simply a naked man lying down presumably 
absolutization. For lack of space, I leave this enormous question in 
suspension. For a challenging discussion of these issues, see Quentin 
Meillassoux, Aft er Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. R. Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), especially chapter 3.
59 Emmanuel Levinas, “Foreword,” in Beyond the Verse, trans. G.D. 
Mole (London: Continuum, 2007), xvi.
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on some grass, in a garden among trees, doing nothing, but 
napping. 
Of course, he was breathing and his heart was beating, 
but he had no control over them. His hairy chest went up and 
down and his heart pumped blood, but without any controlling 
gesture on his part. He occasionally snored, but even this did 
not manage to wake him. It was as if someone else was in 
control of the task of taking air in and out of his lungs and of 
pumping blood in his heart.
Lying there in the sun, he was thus unable to refer to 
himself and therefore to assert himself against another (God 
or nature, for example). He was clearly without referent and 
therefore without power. Even his penis was here useless. He 
was just mere matter, a lump of breathing fl esh.
Th is lack of control was in fact quite remarkable because 
at one point that morning (or aft ernoon?), part of his side 
disappeared. Th is drastic event took place without sedatives. 
Suddenly and without interruption to his snoring, his side was 
wrenched out of him. He clearly was not mastering his body.
But this was not all; he was also unable to control whomever 
was subsequently created from his side. He played no role in 
the creation made of his fl esh and bones. He was neither a 
participant nor an observer. He just slept.
And yet, by having his bones and fl esh wrenched out of him 
while he slept, he also paradoxically became in the process ‘for 
the other.’ He was not just separated from a part of himself; he 
also became ‘for the other,’ a kind of generous inability to hold 
it together, a gift  without mastery or control (an ironic ‘start’ 
for what later will always strive for mastery and control). 
However this gift  was not meant as an altruistic gesture. 
His loss of fl esh and bone was an in-voluntary gift  made to 
whoever was created out of him. Th is gift  was a little unusual 
for it evaded all forms of economy: it expected no return for he, 
himself, was without return. 
As such, this was his own form of maternity. Yes, maternity 
and not paternity for here no conception at a distance took 
place. Th ere was no arousal, penetration, and ejaculation in 
the hope of conception, gestation, and birth. He un-wittingly 
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gave himself in his sleep or more precisely, he un-intentionally 
brought another to the light of day. 
Some will say that this is a strange kind of maternity 
because it more or less coincided with the birth of his ability 
to speak and therefore with his ability to wage war. However, 
such coincidence might have something to do with it. Aft er all, 
through his side gift , he not only gave himself away, he also 
opened up the possibility of disputation and therefore war. 
Unfortunately, there can be no maternity without war.
However, such a gift  was not an indication that he was 
either the fi rst or the only one at the start of creation. Teleology 
here means nothing. Neither cause nor purpose, not even a 
random series of events can structure such a happenstance. 
Th e surreal parting of some fl esh without suff ering or anaes-
thetic clearly places the event in question here outside of all 
logic. If this were not the case, there would be neither fi ction 
(the (re)telling of this or other story) nor facticity (the suff ering 
of birth) in the world. 
Two then started the world. Th e ‘two’ here is what is in 
question; it stands for the impossibility of the question, like, 
for example: Was I snoring? Did you sleep well? Did you have 
nightmares about bleeding to death? Th ese questions are 
impossible because their answers necessitate both facticity and 
fi ction before the invention or creation of facticity and fi ction: 
a glorious aporia that knows no poros. In this way, space and 
time have no origin properly speaking; they open each other 
to create an interruptive doubt or ambiguity about origins, 
wakefulness, and bad dreams.
Aft er much repetitive snoring, he fi nally woke up. Th e 
woman by his side asked him a question. He replied by 
remaining silent, obedient. He did what he was told for she 
had awakened fi rst and already knew the ways of the world. 
She later gave him fruit, which he ate in silence.
Th e end.
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fact
She will have been fi rst. She will have been the fi rst to recognize 
herself not only as a human being awakening one aft ernoon, 
but also, considering the man snoring by her side, as woman. 
In doing so, she will have given him the possibility of also 
recognizing himself. Th e birth of subjectivity will have come 
from her, fi rst.
She will have also been the bearer of another gift : Her 
refusal to bow down to the authority coming from on high (a 
refusal that, as is well known, demonstrates will, autonomy, and 
thoughtfulness) will have given him the power of knowledge. 
(Suddenly, apples are not the only fruit.) 
(Th ese two fi rst gift s show that the process was in fact 
relatively fair: ‘two’ giving each other: on the one hand, as 
it were, fl esh and bones, and on the other, self-recognition 
and knowledge: an odd, but perfect equity—which does not 
mean equality—the separation of what comes together: fl esh 
and word).
However, although their birth took place in perfect equity, 
there will also have been (at least…) four main discrepancies 
(the history of the world is paved with all the others): 
Firstly, for good or bad (and although she was the fi rst 
to be named), she will have given him the opportunity to be 
the fi rst to speak (fi rst discrepancy). (Insolent, he grabbed the 
opportunity unceremoniously: the fi rst to signify. His fi rst 
speech could have been: ‘aft er you, madam,’60 but no…). In 
60 I deliberately (and perhaps a little perversely) reference here 
Levinas’s famous attempt to address the ethical through the sentence: 
‘aft er you, sir.’ Th e aim here again is not gratuitous. Th e aim is simply 
to highlight that even as fi ction (Adam’s parting rib story), the ultimate 
ethical gesture of giveness (Adam’s giving himself away) cannot be 
distinguished from the economy (and therefore the violence) that 
comes with the act of giving (Adam’s fi rst speech). For Levinas’s 
reference, see: Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, trans. A. 
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2004), 186; Emmanuel 
Levinas, Ethics and Infi nity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. 
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doing so, she will have suddenly become ‘the other character.’ 
(As the character who spoke second, she was oft en then 
‘spoken to.’ Th is, as it should always be emphasized, had 
disastrous consequences).
But this will not have been all; in the process (second 
discrepancy), she will have also managed to turn God into a 
character. (As a nameable entity, God thus came third in the 
‘suddenly’ teleological order imposed by language. Such a low 
ranking position meant that He would never be able to regain 
His powers as ‘original’ potter and midwife, thus remaining 
for ever a mere topic of conversation and a(n) (un)reasonable 
addressee for prayers—with all the unfortunate consequences 
that this position entails—being supposedly neutral, the third 
party, the judge…)
Th ird discrepancy: having introduced these two characters, 
she will have also introduced, in the process, the fi ctional story 
summarised above: this story of rupture: the surreal fi ction 
of man’s parting side, parting without origin, immemorial. 
(Unfortunately, as is sadly known, those who interpreted it 
grossly misread it. Th ey—men, obviously—were convinced that 
they once were able to give birth from their side, thus giving 
them the delusion of thinking themselves closer to God… As 
is well known, patriarchy partly rests on a misreading).
Finally (as if giving him the opportunity to be the fi rst 
to speak, turning God into a fi ctional character or witness, 
and introducing the fi ction above was not enough), she will 
have added a fourth discrepancy: she will have kept child-
birth to herself. (No more side-parting for him. Being ‘for the 
other’—epekeina tes ousias—should always be seen—whether 
as fi ction or fact—as a gendered aff air). As compensation, 
she will have given him the shared experience of both sexual 
diff erence (masculine-feminine) and the diff erence of sexes 
(male-female, man-woman). (For good or bad, they tend to 
make the most of this).
R.A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2004), 89; 
and Emmanuel Levinas, Th e Time of the Nations, trans. M.B. Smith 
(London: Continuum, 2007), 97.
 The Side  Stor y  | 65
(But this last discrepancy was not entirely egoistical:) By 
retaining the ability to give birth to herself, she will have also 
given them both the seemingly endless possibility of change. 
(Th ey now occupy historical positions: being a son-becoming-




What is one to make of this juxtaposition of fi ction and 
facticity, the latter being more or less comprehensible with 
the use of the future anterior? What does this inversion of 
biological truth (the fi ction of ‘a’ man giving birth to a woman) 
and this biological fact (the facticity of ‘a’ woman giving away 
subjectivity, knowledge, speech, fi ction, and babies) tells us?
Th e meeting of fi ction and facticity shows that each 
protagonist constitutes him or herself not in order to form a 
whole, but in separation. Th ey are together as separation,61 a 
strange kind of status that never coheres either as a lovely story 
(turning a rib into a woman makes surrealist stories somewhat 
second rate) or as a comprehensible event (birth is, aft er all, 
always a miraculous fact).
As such, they will always already be unable, not to be whole 
in a Platonic sense, but to totalise themselves. Th e meeting of 
facticity (woman’s birthing comprehensible only through the 
use of the future anterior) and fi ction (man’s chronological 
story narrated in the past tense) is a meeting that leaves them 
(man and woman) unable to perceive themselves as singular 
61 I explore this expression in detail in Aft er ‘Rwanda.’ I borrow this 
expression from Derrida who writes: “Face to face with the other 
within a glance and a speech which both maintain distance and 
interrupt all totalities, this being together as separation [cet être 
ensemble comme séparation] precedes or exceeds society, collectivity, 
community”: Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay 
on the Th ought of Emmanuel Levinas,” trans. A. Bass, in Writing and 
Diff erence (London: Routledge, 2001), 119, my emphasis.
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meaningful entities (either as a singular moment in space and 
time or as what is always already outside of space and time).
In this way, their sex, like their lives, is always already 
‘not yet.’ Man and woman are, each time, another man and 
woman, another experience, another life. Hence the fact that 
they could always be the wrong guys: they never are in the 
right place, always already elsewhere. In this way, He and She 
are always already futural and yet curiously unable to predict 
the future.
Th us man and woman are not just better or worse halves 
to each other; they are always already equivocal, always open 
to interpretation: at once clearly defi ned and recognizable as 
such and yet never absolutely cogent or coherent: each one 
expecting the other to make sense of their being together as 
the sense of their togetherness separates them away. With and 
without the other, they cannot live.
Th us, when they play, they are simultaneously always 
already in need (past repeating itself as present) and desire (the 
present projecting itself as future), a muddle of fact and fi ction 
ruled by a mixture of concupiscence and transcendence that 
keeps them together as separation: the enigmatic as such. 
However, this fi ction and this facticity are not everything. 
In their equivocalness, they are still mortal, vulnerable, and 
sensitive; neither man nor woman is eternal and, as the cliché 
goes, that is precisely the only thing they have in common: the 
fact of being born and dying—mortal neuters with sexes. 
Th is fi nite nature brings eschatology (man ‘never-two’) 
and messianism (woman ‘sometimes-two’) together. Th is 
togetherness, as we have seen, is not a cosy work in tandem 
or a necessary correlation, but a union-separation that is 
irreducible to any traditional form of reading or logic of 
representation: being together as separation.
Considering such an odd situation, their task, should they 
accept it, would then be to provide each other with what they 
ought to give away: an end to the story (man), the beginning of 
the story (woman). Th eir task is therefore not to seek union or 
fusion, but to maintain together their separation. Each ending 
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and each beginning validating and cancelling each other thus 
making them ‘be’ a little longer still.
Th is task is akin to love, because to love the other is to give 
what one does not have: the end, the beginning. Again, this 
does not mean that these will match, in the way one would 
imagine the end matching the beginning, for example. Th ere 
is no eternal return here, not even of the type that recurs every 
second of time because love creates time indistinguishably as 
end and as beginning.
To give what one does not have is therefore to ensure that 
ends and beginnings, fact and fi ction remain always already in 
play, in love. Th e task is to never overcome the duality ‘man and 
woman’ however much they try, however much it gets blurry, 
and however much they are always called upon at sunrise and 




Straying not far from the garden, I meet a man. Th e non-erotic 
caress that I originally experienced in my solitude before 
falling asleep suddenly acquires sense: directing itself this 
time towards this other. I now become aware of how touching 
him leads me to places I would have previously never imagined 
existing. In doing so, I now enter the realm of the diff erence 
of sexes. 
To follow a Deleuzian vocabulary, this encounter shows 
that I have now become someone who, in his sexual comport-
ment—a comportment that isn’t unique—strives in the process 
to become inhuman.62 I am not just a human being with a rigid 
sexual identity. As I touch this other man, I awake my body’s 
intensities and surprise it by making it other to myself, that 
is, inhuman. 
62 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. M. Joughin (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 11.
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Th e longing for this never-quite-attainable inhumanity 
shows that every time I have sex, I have a new sex. One new 
sex on each occasion. Th is shows that I can never precisely 
calculate the gift  of my sexual life. My sexuality is always 
already in the order of the incalculable. Th ere is nothing 
extraordinary about this. My sexuality is simply, like other 
sexualities, always already to-come.
Such a familiar openness to the future usually tends to 
obscure the end63 of this particular form of sexuality: in my 
case, two men: the cum cloth (or any other means of discarding 
semen). Where is this sexuality going once both need and 
desire have been fulfi lled? Th e answer to this question is 
usually the laundry basket: the place that holds the promise of 
another time, the possibility that the gesture will be repeated. 
But what does this repetition, which is also a promise, really 
stand for?
Understood more broadly, the question can perhaps be 
formulated in this way: Factually and in most cases, fecundity 
requires sexuality, but sexuality does not require fecundity. 
What end is then sought in a sexuality without the potential of 
fecundity? In other words, does this type of sexuality embody 
a type of eschatology that avoids—to speak in broad terms—
any form of messianism: the meetings of (genetic) dead ends? 
Th e aim of this chapter is to challenge the manner in which 
language (including queer theory64) ossifi es us and delivers 
63 Th e end sought in this chapter is limited to sexuality. Ends such as 
‘being in love’ and ‘being in an amorous companionship,’ for example, 
would necessitate another set of references and another vocabulary 
that, for lack of space, cannot be addressed here. For example (amongst 
others): Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. 
R. Howard (London: Vintage, 2002).
64 Queer theory ossifi es us because it rarely acknowledges that the 
term ‘queer’ cannot be defi ned in advance. Queer should always 
be a term that resists hypostatization and reifi cation into a proper 
nominal status. Th e only way queer theory can indeed retain its cred-
ibility as a tool for thought is if it always begins with this resistance 
against a defi nition. For such careful caution, see the Introduction 
to Carla Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2005).
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us without us having our say, that is, without waiting for us 
to give birth to it. Th e aim is thus to invent new words and 
new ways of thinking in order once again to prevent language 
burying us—as always—too quickly.
Unsurprisingly, these new words do not originate out of 
the blue. Th ey stem from other traditions and affi  liations. 
One in particular will draw most of our attention: Emmanuel 
Levinas’s understanding of fecundity, especially in the way 
Catherine Chalier’s interprets it. Th ere is no space here to 
expose Chalier’s interpretation. Suffi  ce to say that it signifi -
cantly departs from the majority of scholarship on Levinas’s 
fecundity in the way it takes the law of absolute heteronomy 
seriously. And this, as hopefully will be demonstrated in the 
following pages, helps give ‘gay’ sex a hereto unheard of future.
In accord with this diff erent affi  liation and the perspective 
taken in the Introduction, the following will inevitably not 
address the creation of diff erent historical temporalities (or 
alternative ‘chronotopes’) in order to question or combat 
hetero-normative time, this ‘reproductive futurism’ that, 
according to Lee Edelman and others always associates the 
future with the fi gure of the child.65 Th ere are two reasons 
for this:
Th e radicality of heterogeneous time does not allow for the 
assertion that there is such a thing as a singular abstraction 
(‘heterosexual,’ ‘homosexual’ or ‘queer,’ for example) that can 
be isolated from a larger social matrix. However much one 
65 Once again, this is not intended as a pitch against queer theorists, but 
as an attempt to put under close scrutiny the problematic of the spatial 
and temporal dimension of sexual subjectivity; a dimension that, as 
stated in the Introduction cannot do away with the radical interruption 
brought upon by the law of absolute heterogeneity. For this reason, this 
chapter cannot address the remarkable issues raised by authors who 
are invested in creating non-linear and/or non-fi liative temporal bio-
political subjectivities. For the most prominent of these authors, see 
Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Th eory and the Death Drive (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2005) and Tim Dean, Unlimited Intimacy: 
Refl ections on the Subculture of Barebacking (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009). See also, Carla Freccero, “Fuck the Future,” GLQ: 
A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 12, no. 2 (2006): 332–4.
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cannot really dispense from producing or inscribing lexical, 
cultural, social, or political diff erences, these in turn can never 
escape the possibility of being put into question. Th rough 
this ever-persisting questioning and the possibilities off ered 
by answers, futurity then comes to light—and this is what 
will have to be shown in this chapter—as that which knows 
no discrimination.66
Secondly, and more generally, whether ‘straight’ or 
‘queer,’ humanity does not seek to exclusively express itself 
by productions or inscriptions (of subjectivities), but by its 
approach to the other. In the context explored here, this 
approach, as will become evident, is only an attempt to evade 
(as much as possible) the oppressive tyranny of this ‘I’ that 
always seeks to gather itself into presence and representation 
(‘I am a father’ or ‘I am a bug-chaser,’ for example) and with the 
other to always provoke, maintain, renew or push further our 
very inhumanity.
Please also note that the following will assume as a general 
principle that, notwithstanding modern reproductive tech-
niques, a ‘gay’ erotic encounter does not usually lead to procre-
ation. As such, men who seek sex with men do not usually seek 
to become parents. Th ose who do will probably not identify 
themselves in the following pages. 
death
Besides the fact that it can be washed, the soiled cum cloth 
embodies death. Washed, the future disappears amidst deter-
gent and water down the drain. As such, this cloth exposes the 
inevitability of my death: there will be no more of ‘me’ in the 
future: ‘me-as-other’ stops there in the wash.  
Th is particular end diff ers from that aimed at during 
masturbatory activities. Th ese are performed (most of time, 
66 Th is does not exclude or negate, obviously, the possibility of creating 
futurities (queer or otherwise) for political purposes. For a remarkable 
example, see José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: Th e Th en and Th ere 
of Queer Futurity (New York: New York University Press, 2009).
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in solitude) as a form of relief from the tension imposed by 
testosterone. Th e end in this case is always already assumed 
in advance as self-evident. However much phantasmagorical 
characters populate the visual fi eld and/or the imaginary, 
masturbation simply confi rms solitude.
By contrast, in the amorous encounter in question here, 
what this (oft en shared) soft  towel exposes is a deliberate act 
not only of emphasizing the importance of the present over the 
future, but also and above all of forbidding the future. Th ere is 
a secret prescription that comes here in the activity that leads 
to this towel: the future is curtailed. 
Happy with such a prescription, I live with and for my 
self and my death, even if this living takes place alongside 
another, in an amorous companionship, for example. In this 
way, each time I have sex, the unique, solitary, unchange-
able, and extreme relation that exists with my death becomes 
exacerbated (and this even if I decide to ‘acquire’ children and/
or pets and avoid at all cost saunas and backrooms).
I therefore live conscious of the fact that, unlike the 
majority of earthlings, I no longer possess an already predeter-
mined or prescribed future. My scrotum is of no importance, 
only the penis counts (or here perhaps more specifi cally, only 
the phallus counts). Alone and valiant, I live without false 
pretences, such as believing in eternity or life aft er death, 
for example. 
My erotic pleasures (and to some extent, my other forms 
of sociality) therefore always fail to open the future. Th e 
future remains for me exclusively that which comes with my 
possibility of no longer being-there. I live existentially (and, 
for some, socially and culturally) more than others precisely 
because of such lack of opening in my future.67
Let me return to this erotic encounter. Th e man I have just 
met caresses me until he founders in some orifi ce. In doing 
so, he does not attain ‘communion’ in view of someone else. 
67 Modern and contemporary literature and cinema swarm with 
examples of such ‘high life,’ from John Rechy’s City of Night to Jonathan 
Kemp’s 26 and from Frank Ripploh’s Taxi zum Klo to Ana Kokkinos’s 
Head-On to only mention arbitrary examples.
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In this orifi ce, he only reaches the place where ‘the feeling and 
the felt speak to each other.’68 However, such speech is always 
already at a dead end.
Th e feeling and the felt go indeed so far as the vertigo 
can go. Neither he nor I lose our mastery and/or method, no 
biological mechanism is triggered and therefore no new birth 
can potentially come from that which is left  either inside me 
or on my stomach. In this way and however adrenalized the 
occasion, our love-making is always already a return to the 
same—even if this same is here ‘two.’
eros
Let me now take some distance. However problematic it 
is to non-hetero-normative readings, ‘heterosexual’ erotic 
encounters are usually understood in pair with the concept of 
fecundity, in as much as they potentially promise the birth of 
a child. In other words, even when no children are sought, a 
‘heterosexual’ encounter (even when it is mediated by a turkey 
baster or a clinical intermediary) is somehow always directed 
to the future via a potential fecundity.
Th e ‘heterosexual’ encounter is therefore an event 
of alterity; a relationship with what is absent at the very 
moment when everything appears to be there. In this way, 
the encounter takes the subject outside of itself, outside of the 
world of possessions and power. In doing so, the very structure 
of subjectivity changes as it encounters a dimension of futurity 
(the danger or the promise of a child) that is diff erent from 
that of death. 
In this way, the ‘heterosexual’ encounter is that which 
potentially can provoke an ‘other’ who, uniquely, can never 
68 I follow here—perhaps a little perversely—Luce Irigaray’s 
argument, but with obvious diff erent ends in mind. See Luce 
Irigaray, “Th e Fecundity of the Caress: A Reading of Levinas’ 
Totality and Infi nity,” trans. C. Burke and G. Gill, in Feminist 
Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Tina Chanter 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 122.
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provide a return strictly speaking. By fulfi lling this poten-
tial, the parents can thus eventually experience the fact of 
being both themselves and others to themselves. Th is is the 
only other physical relation to transcendence they will have 
besides death.69
Th e product of their sexual encounter—the child—thus 
introduces a multiplicity and therefore another future into 
the heart of the parents. With fecundity, a heterogeneity and 
a transcendence thus appear in the always mono-logic and 
monolithic verb ‘to exist.’70
fecundity
In this sense, fecundity is not so much a biological capacity to 
produce an off spring; it is also an escape or a way out of being 
(one). In other words, to have the ability to achieve the birth of 
a child comes in pair with a move beyond the biological. At an 
ontological level, fecundity thus opens one’s mortality beyond 
any form of determined singularity.
Th is explains why fecundity neatly addresses the issue 
of a mortal life’s meaning. A child is always a unique new 
beginning, a new responsibility to whom life can be handed 
over, continued, retrieved, amended, expiated, and to a certain 
degree, for some, fulfi lled. Th is partly explains why engravings 
69 Th e type of transcendence exposed here can only be of a kind that 
cannot be lessened or appropriated. Our relationship to death is one 
such type of transcendence. Th e other is our relationship to the other 
and specifi cally here, to the child who, in most cases, will survive us 
beyond death. Emmanuel Levinas provides the clearest explanation for 
why this transcendence needs to be as radical as possible: “Th e unfore-
seeable character of the ultimate instant is not due to an empirical 
ignorance, to the limited horizon of our understanding, which a 
greater understanding would have been able to overcome. Th e unfore-
seeable character of death is due to the fact that it does not lie within 
any horizon. It is not open to grasp”: Levinas, Totality and Infi nity, 233.
70 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infi nity, Conversations with Philippe 
Nemo, trans. R.A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
2004), 72.
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on tombstones are most oft en than not a marker of survival 
(‘To Granny’).
Furthermore, through fecundity, the child also stands for 
the continuation of the human race. In other words, the birth 
of a child is that which signifi es a projection toward the future 
in terms of fulfi lling a commandment that is older than history 
itself. Th is is the ethico-religious signifi cance of fecundity, one 
that cannot be entirely dissociated from a mere existential or 
individualistic projection.
Finally, the relation between parents and child provides an 
‘account’ of how humanity is overall produced: With a child, 
society, history, and therefore, overall, (homogeneous) time 
itself become exposed. In that sense, a child goes beyond the 
temporal immediacy of a historically localized encounter with 
another human being, a family, and a history to become ‘that 
which’ gives time.
At a banal level, this exposure or this givenness could be 
read as a confi rmation once again of a hegemonic hetero-
normative teleological structure or law. However, I’d rather 
read it here as a situation that does not imply the vapidity 
of a teleological evolution (have we not overcome this long 
ago?), but that of a meeting of always ex-ceeding ends: one end 
(father or mother) ex-ceeding itself onto and as an(other) end 
(the child) who is the same and yet altogether another (son/
daughter – man/woman).
Th e child is thus not the commonplace evidential ‘product’ 
of a heteronormative construction of time, but like their 
parents, and before them, their forefathers and foremothers, 
an ungraspable property. By this I mean that neither the 
parent nor the child can be understood as self-contained 
subjects ready to be grasped as if they were  ‘properties,’ but 
as ungraspable entities that de-propriate71 themselves every 
second of time. In this way, the child is not the hegemonic 
71 I borrow again this expression from Heidegger. In his later work, 
Heidegger indeed looked for words that would indicate the event of 
Being otherwise. He chose, for example, the word ‘disclosive appropri-
ating Event’ (Ereignis, from ereignen, ‘appropriate,’ and eraeugen, to see 
and disclose), which stands for a pure subjectless happening. He also 
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‘emblem’ of a conventional futurity, but what can never be 
reduced to a property and as such creates, like you or me, time, 
every time, anew.
the schism virility-parenting
Now how does this ‘heterosexual’ structure fare in comparison 
to my erotic encounter with this man? Th e issue is perhaps that 
in this specifi c embrace, a schism appears to take place in me.
Th is schism is not so much that between scrotum and penis 
(or phallus) as mentioned earlier, but more precisely, between 
parenting and virility, that is, here, specifi cally between 
my parental potential and my virile self—a schism here not 
exclusively conceived in biological terms.72 How can I make 
sense of this schism of and in my subjectivity?
Virility usually implies the fact of having strength, energy, 
or a strong sex drive. Contrary to this commonplace assump-
tion, I understand virility as the expression of a subject closed 
in on itself, a subject who is self-suffi  cient, pure self-possession. 
Closed in on itself, my virility therefore not only continually 
returns me to myself; it also transforms this self into an object. 
chose the noun ‘depropriation’ or ‘expropriation’ as the self-withdrawal 
of being (Enteignung). See Heidegger, On Being and Time, 23.
72 Many commentators accuse Levinas of understanding paternity 
in biological terms. As the following extract shows, paternity, as the 
opening of infi nity, can clearly be conceived outside of biology: “Th e 
fact of seeing the possibilities of the other as your own possibilities, of 
being able to escape the closure of your identity and what is bestowed 
on you, towards something which is not bestowed on you and which 
nevertheless is yours—this is paternity. Th is future beyond my own 
being, this dimension constitutive of time, takes on a concrete content 
in paternity. It is not necessary that those who have no children see 
in this fact any depreciation whatever, biological fi liality is only the 
fi rst shape fi liality takes; but one can very well conceive fi liality as a 
relationship between human beings without the tie of biological 
kinship. One can have a paternal attitude with regard to the Other. 
To consider the Other as a son is precisely to establish with him those 
relations I call ‘beyond the possible’”: Levinas, Ethics and Infi nity, 70.
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Virile, I push myself and drag myself like a possession until I 
die and nothing will stop me in my path. 
Th e consequence of this quasi-autistic self-possessed 
resoluteness forces the subject to relate to its future only as 
an endlessly re-affi  rmed power (even if it only encounters 
failures). Not even the other (male or female) in its weakness or 
magnanimity can interfere (let alone diminish or refrain) this 
re-affi  rmation.73 Th e self-enclosure of the virile subject knows 
no other future, but its re-affi  rmation. 
From the standpoint of the virile subject alone, the parent-
child relationship can only therefore be understood as a 
confl ict of wills, especially if it is—as is so oft en the case—
confused with biological determinations such as paternity or 
fatherhood. Freud’s notion of paternity, for example, makes 
the father-son relationship specifi cally a virile struggle for 
recognition in which the son must kill the father in order to 
inherit his recognition, designation, and power. 
In contrast to virility, parenting frees the self from its self-
enchainment and forces it to draw a line on this projection in 
order to open up to the other. Virility is the experience of the 
power of the subject, whereas parenting is the experience of 
the limit of the mastery of the subject. Parenting is therefore 
‘a fracture’ in and of the virile subject. It breaks the obsessive 
self-suffi  ciency and self-possession of virility. 
Th e parent-child relationship thus becomes unique in that 
the parent’s ‘I’ breaks free of itself without ceasing to be ‘I.’ 
As stated earlier, it is the only relationship in which the self 
becomes other and, extraordinarily, survives.74 Th e ‘I’ breaks 
free of what ties it to itself, so that it can reach out to another, 
73 Th is is particularly evident not in rugby players to take a cliché 
example of supposed virility, but in transgendered persons where the 
power exerted over a biological given oft en—but not always—aff ords 
little or no weakening.
74 I follow here Levinas’s argument developed in Time and the Other. 
However, as should be self-evident, this reading attempts to rethink his 
argument anew without loosing sight of its uncompromising, but oft en 
forgotten eschatological and transcendental radicality. See Levinas, 
Time and the Other.
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even become other to itself and this breaking out is precisely 
what opens the future: the fact that the ‘I’ suddenly becomes 
un-recognizable, transformed nearly beyond recognition. 
Th is process of becoming other to the self-suffi  ciency of 
the virile self (or the process of giving space and time to the 
unrecognizable) therefore opens up the possibility of a beyond 
all possibilities, an openness to an unpredictable and undeter-
minable future. In a way, unlike the obsessive self-control of 
virility, parenting implies a future with another (self) who is 
necessarily out of control and this even if the child is a model 
of perfection. 
the question
What happens then if a schism occurs between virility and 
parenting? In other words, what happens if the potential for 
parenting is recurrently left  aside and only virility is given 
pre-eminence? Can the time of (‘gay’) sexual pleasure truly 
manage to open another dimension of temporality, irreducible 
either to the imminence of death or to the future announced 
by parenting?
Th e argument sought here is that my erotic encounter 
with this man is driven neither by desire nor by a mere need 
(a merely hedonic virile economy typical of the ‘gay’ scene, for 
example), but by an opening to a hidden future that manages 
nonetheless to eschew both parenting and death. In other 
words, my love for this man opens a dimension that still 
manages to go beyond being. How is this possible?
caress-as-touch
Caressing or touching75 this brawny and hairy man is a 
peculiar act. However much I attempt to please and satisfy 
75 In contrast to what was explored in chapter 2, “Sexual Diff erence,” 
the caress in this context—the context of the diff erence of sexes—
necessarily falls in the realm of the senses. As stated before, Derrida 
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his appetites, my caress is not ‘for him’ strictly speaking; but 
for a future never future enough. In other words and to follow 
Levinas’s vocabulary, the caress does not know what it seeks. 
Aside from the economy of the orgasm, the caress is also, 
aff ectively and eff ectively, the anticipation of a future without 
content, an anticipation that opens onto the ungraspable.
To use a diff erent Levinasian vocabulary, I could also say 
that my erotic encounter expresses a way of being worried by 
a diff erence that never ceases to be diff erent. Th is worry does 
not drive me (back) in search of a reassuring sameness; it goes 
instead towards what is more than me or him—an alluring and 
dangerous ‘beyond us.’ Th e caress seeks not a union of two, 
but on the contrary, a diff erence that my worry never manages 
to overcome.
My caress therefore seeks a future that is measured by 
neither procreation nor death, but by the call to the birth of 
self and other, that is, to what is not yet human. In other words, 
when I touch him, I search for what has not yet come into 
being; my caress seeks what (in or all over me and him) has not 
yet become (of me and of him). 
Th is relation with the future is therefore not exclusively 
channelled into a power or an empowerment (which would 
be the inevitable outcome of and return to virility); it invites 
instead a time that is paradoxically both mine and not-mine; 
a possibility for myself that is also a possibility for the other. 
Th ese are strange kinds of possibilities, because they do 
not enter into the logical essence of what is usually understood 
exposes this type of caress in a commentary on Levinas’s work: “Th e 
caress gives or takes. And/or it gives and takes. In giving it takes; it 
gives to take; it takes up giving—what one calls pleasure a little hastily. 
In pleasure, the caress besieges us, it invests us with a non-theoretical 
and besetting question, with a worry constitutive of pleasure itself: 
‘What is this pleasure? What is that? Where does it come from? From 
the other or from me? Am I taking it? Am I giving it? Is it the other 
who gives it to me? Or takes it form me? Th e time of this pleasure is 
it that I am giving it myself?’ And so forth. And if these hypotheses 
were not contradictory or incompatible, how would one need to 
think them? Declare them? Even confess them?”: Jacques Derrida, On 
Touching Jean-Luc Nancy, 75.
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by the possible. No ability or capacity can predetermine them. 
Contingency rules these possibilities, and that is why they 
make ‘us’ dangerously prevaricate between the same and the 
other, the worry and the diff erence. Th ere would be no caress 
if this were not the case.
In this way, and contrary to all expectations in this sultry 
man-on-man scenario, we still bestow life on each other. 
Our love manages to fecundate both of us in turn. We do not 
become reborn; we simply give birth to each other, that is, to 
an ‘other’ that neither of us can recognize properly. In other 
words, we love each other as the bodies that we surprisingly 
become, that is, for their very inhumanity. 
Once again, this is not hedonistic or a self-enclosed battle 
of virilities or willies; this is on the contrary a love that seeks to 
disjoin space and time and therefore the solid certainty of the 
virile subject who always believes himself stronger than space 
and time. In other words, this is a love that seeks to dislocate 
the delusions of mastery, making bodies shiver for being 
unable, at last, to predict and/or project into the future.
equals
Th e alterity sought here is obviously of a diff erent register than 
that provided by death or by a child. It concerns a futurity that 
frets about on the edges of eschatology and messianism; a fret-
ting that re-inscribes a ‘between’ that is neither masculine nor 
feminine; a birth that accomplishes not a return to the same, 
but another (self/other) whose face (in a Levinasian sense) will 
break in ways that are always utterly unrecognizable. 
However, not unlike for death and for a child, this alterity 
(sought here where the sun never has a chance of shining) 
still remains undecidable: at once me and the other, at once 
historical and a-historical. Flesh and bones, this new self/
other becomes the intangible, but very real resistance—with 
all its spatial and temporal connotations—against the tide of 
presence.
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In this way, our love, this love devoid of all potential 
parenting, still manages to open another dimension of tempo-
rality. Th e dried up cum-cloth has obviously no future; it will 
always already remain locked within the economy of the same, 
but—however cliché this sounds—our love is here to stay, each 
time defying what we mean by sur-vival.76 Is this not precisely 
this defi ance that scares homophobes so much?
Th e ‘outcome’ of this resistance against the tide of presence 
(‘I’) or this defi ance against reproductive futurity, in other 
words, the ‘outcome’ of this alternate future to babies or death, 
creates a strange form of equality between men and women, 
‘heterosexuals’ and ‘homosexuals’ (or any other invented 
abstraction): ‘we’ are all equals as makers of the future; ‘we’ 
are the arch-originary carrying forth of self-engendering-the-
other, whether ‘we’ raise children or ‘breed’ HIV till death do 
us part. End(s) indeed always meet so that there is future, even 
if it is short.
In this way, no acquisition of children can open the future 
more than ‘us’ not as a couple or collectivity, but as we come 
together as separation. Th e child as the ‘door’ to the future 
is only an ephemeral illusion because as soon as birth has 
taken place, the child will also have to negotiate the bounds 
that fi nitude imposes on him or her. In defi ance (if it is a boy, 
endlessly disposing the tissue, sock, banana peal, or indeed 
the cum cloth) or in a determined move or absentmindedness 
76 Th e word ‘sur-vival’ is here left  open because it does not refer to 
some kind of vitalist survival, but following Derrida, to what lives 
over and beyond life. As Judith Butler clearly explains: “[Derrida] is 
clear about the ﬁnality of death, but he returns to the task of affi  rming 
what he calls survival, la survie. He references Walter Benjamin who, 
in “Th e Task of the Translator,” makes a distinction between überleben 
(survival) of a part, surviving death, as a book can survive the death 
of its author or a child survives the death of a parent, and fortleben, 
living on, continuing to live, the continuation of life itself. ‘Survival’ 
carries these two meanings, continuing to live, but also, he emphasizes, 
living aft er death.” See Judith Butler, “On Never Having Learned How 
to Live,” Diff erences 16, no. 3 (2005): 30, and Jacques Derrida, “Je suis 
en guerre contre moi-même,” Le Monde (18 Aug. 2004).
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(putting semen to use), he or she will also remain the very 




Most of time the focus is on the vertical conduit or delivery 
system that shamelessly always tries to reach up as high as 
is humanly possible. Any discourse for which this upright 
conduit is standard emphasizes the triumph of verticality, 
signifi cation, and self-possession. For some, this conduit 
is the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the 
(toy-like) entertainment prop that sets the standard for 
everything else… 
But what is one to think of the site of production 
underneath? Little attention is indeed paid to what we will call 
here the factory. By over-emphasizing the heroic uprightness 
of the tubular member, man-folk and their relationships to 
other bodies, male or female, suff er from an unfair distortion: 
everything is always about the mastery of the earth and skies, 
and not about the work that goes on in order for this supposed 
mastery to take place.
But this is not all. By over-emphasizing erectility over 
what goes on below, the general tendency is to ignore the fact 
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that the factory, contrary to the endlessly repeated selfi sh-
ness attributed to the vertical conduit (and men by default), 
produces something ‘for another.’ Th is ‘product for another’ 
is a diffi  cult one to describe, as it is never neutral: it is both 
potentially positive and negative, a threat and a gift ; the most 
problematic because emblematic double-bind off ering men 
can put forward.
In this way, and unlike verticality, signifi cation, and self-
possession and therefore pleasure, the site of production 
necessarily implies ‘two’; it is, however dangerous it is to 
recognize this, inescapably social. Th is does not necessarily 
emphasize reproduction. Even when no procreation is sought 
out, the factory still produces ‘for the other’ even when there is 
violence—we will come back to this.
Overall, when it comes to that which is below, the hack-
neyed question is always invariably and tiresomely: is there 
a factory there or not? Th is has nothing to do with the 
visibility of the factory (whether it is hidden or dangling 
noticeably) or the invisibility of its work. Th is has to do with 
the factory’s ability or capacity to generate what it takes for the 
upright character to play its role. As will become evident, this 
commonplace ur-question refers to something infi nitely more 
complex than at fi rst anticipated.
As the above references to ‘tubular member,’ ‘conduit’ and 
‘upright character’ clearly show, the following text will not 
address the mechanisms, structures, and discourses imposed 
by that other metaphor, the monolithic psychoanalytical ogre 
known as the phallus. Th is does not mean to invalidate, evade 
or discard any link between the body and a whole range of 
already existing metaphors, symbols, and tools used by that 
discipline or practice. I simply have no expertise in articulating 
what follows from a psychoanalytical perspective. 
Th e aim instead is to put forward a diff erent metaphor (i.e. 
here the factory) in order to address, in one’s own terms, the 
experience of a living male body, even if it is deeply problem-
atic in other disciplines or practices such as psychoanalysis (in 
a way, what follows is ripe for the couch: a promising narrative 
full, no doubt, of neurotic symptoms of castration anxieties 
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and the like). However, the idea is, as has been shown many 
times before, that the phallus is not the only signifi er of mascu-
linity and masculine sexuality is not exclusively phallocentric. 
Something else is also at stake and this is what will remain to 
be shown with this alternative or complementary metaphor.
Inevitably the danger in elaborating another metaphor of 
this kind is to be accused of yet another simplistic biological 
reductionism (‘ironically,’ alongside that other reduction, 
the phallus). In order to prevent this danger, I can only refer-
ence here Jean-Luc Nancy who says that the body is not just a 
biological, social or cultural entity; it is also that which fi rst 
articulates space (and) time. Th e body, following Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Merleau-Ponty before him, is indeed that which 
takes place at the limit; it is an event at the limit of sense, in 
the emergence of sense and signifi cation. Th e body does not 
have sense (or have a phallus) and it is not sense (be a phallus). 
Th e body can only be “the taking place of sense [l’avoir-lieu du 
sens].”77 
As the taking place of sense, the body can only generate 
metaphors, symbols and tools (the phallus, the factory, etc.) 
only if it also exceeds, defi es, and challenges them at the same 
time. Th is is the body’s double bind, one which no disciplines 
can overcome once and for all, and this however much they 
try. In a way, the body is precisely that which forces disci-
plines to always become unrecognizable. In the end, the body 
always wins.
Armed in this way against the accusation of crude 
biologism, the aim of the following chapter is therefore to think 
a more provisional, heuristic and personal gesture that goes—
on all accounts—with the sense of this body, that is, with the 
way this body exceeds itself. Th e aim behind this gesture is to 
suggest the idea of turning the discussion on the male body 
(and its ontological structure) towards not so much a diff erent 
metaphor, but a diff erent mode of operation and description. 
Finally, please note that the following reference to the 
factory is deliberately and self-consciously intended to come 
77 Nancy, Corpus, 119.
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across as butch, sturdy, and robust. Considering the fact that 
this site of production is physically rather fragile, one would 
have perhaps expected a more delicate or dainty metaphor. But 
this would have never worked. Th e aim behind the use of this 
cliché or macho metaphor is really to emphasize something 
very common to men: their (obsessive) propensity to produce. 
bromide
Th e factory is a dual-chambered excrescence. It is strategically 
located between elevation and descent into darkness. Th e 
reason for this position appears to be to keep the factory at a low 
temperature. For this reason, the factory has the curious char-
acteristic of continually contracting or extending itself in order 
to keep the ambient temperature at optimal productive condi-
tions. Th is movement up and down is completely involuntary 
and results in oft en-amusing changes in appearance. 
In each chamber, the factory produces its goods and 
the substance that gives life to them (as well as wanted or 
unwanted side eff ects elsewhere—unusual growths or changes 
in tone, for example). Th e factory itself isn’t heavy or large, but 
ludicrously small in comparison to the importance of its role: 
twenty grams at most and about fi ve centimetres in length.
A common myth, based on some obscure etymological 
homonymy, says that the factory is the witness to the 
(in)exhaustible work of the pipe above.78 In other words, there 
would be no law without these witnesses guaranteeing the 
assumed authority of the ‘one.’ And the fact that it is located in 
a dual-chambered setting confi rms this obscure homonymy, 
thus attributing to them a certain truth-value: one confi rming 
what they other has ‘witnessed.’ 
Th ere is a whole series of words—some caricatural—that 
conjures up the factory’s attributes. In most cases, these have 
78 For such an etymological homonymy, see Joshua T. Katz, “Testimonia 
Ritus Italici: Male Genitalia, Solemn Declarations, and a New Latin 
Sound Law,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 98 (1998): 183–217.
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been made to include the tubular member.79 If one confi nes 
oneself to the site of production these words are: tool-kit, 
gear, accessory, the machines, the instruments, and even the 
equipment, to take only examples from the specifi c ‘builder’s’ 
vocabulary opted here. Th e most signifi cant is perhaps ‘the 
attire,’ which designates the couple of objects destined to 
perform the particular task necessary to accomplish the 
symbolic work of the over-exposed one above. 
However, the factory is not always well equipped. 
Sometimes the accessory is insuffi  cient, the tool-kit malfunc-
tions, the machinery is ineffi  cient, the instruments fail to 
perform, the gear is unsatisfactory. When this happens, the law 
of the ‘one’ becomes debatable and war rages on. But however 
unhappy it is, one thing is certain: it never ever goes on strike. 
Even defeated, it produces till the bitter end. 
When in good working order, the factory produces its good 
on a regular basis, some say, on average 10,000 outputs over a 
life-time. Th e goods—referred in some contexts as pearl jam—
are tiny, but each one contains constituents that rank in the 
millions. It takes two and a half months from development to 
maturity. Once it is mature, the goods can travel a ‘mighty’ 
7.5-10 centimeters or 3-4 inches on their own and survive from 
30 seconds to 6 days depending on conditions. 
79 In a candidly written text, Paul Smith uncovers probably the most 
under-studied of these expressions: vas as in vas deferens. Drawing 
inspiration from Michèle Montrelay’s work and particularly her text 
“L’Appareillage,” he writes: “Th e characteristic feature of the pre-
oedipal in the male imaginary would then be its va(s)cillation. Vas: 
that which men carry around in the real and which at the same time 
contains the unsymbolizable; it represents that which we consist in and 
that which we don’t symbolize; that which we both carry and lose; or, 
to use an older vocabulary, that which we both accumulate and spend”: 
Paul Smith “Vas,” Camera Obscura 6, no. 2 (May 1988): 101. See also 
Judith Halberstam’s commentary in relation to female masculinity in: 
Judith Halberstam, “Th e Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Men, Women, 
and Masculinity,” in Masculinity Studies and Feminist Th eory: New 
Directions, ed. Judith Kegan Gardiner (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002), especially 354–6.
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Of course, the end result of this work is that once the goods 
enter the infamous pipe, its goods can travel at a ‘whoopee’ 28 
mph, but by then, the show is no longer the factory’s. Th e law 
of the ‘one’ takes over and witnesses change.
filth
Th e process of fabrication and delivery is oft en seen as a form of 
defi lement. It is a form of fi lth because it transgresses borders, 
which means that it also transgresses identities. Th e reason 
this is oft en mentioned is because identities are oft en tied to 
their physical borders and anything that passes through these 
borders is seen as a threat to its supposed self-containment.
Of course, the goods produced in this factory are not 
unique in being seen as a form of fi lth that threatens stability 
and autonomy. Others, some of which cannot be mentioned 
here, have the same worrisome and dangerous status. 
However, something distinguishes it from these other 
threats. Julia Kristeva indeed says that the factory’s produce is 
simply more abject than others.80 It is abject because, once it is 
out, it still stands for the possibility of life and as such, it is still, 
as mentioned earlier, out of control, accidental, chancy. Th is 
is more controversial than it seems at fi rst because the goods 
are eff ectively the only type of fi lth that potentially remains 
outside of all forms of mastery. 
Outside of any form of control, the goods fall outside of the 
law. No one can indeed explain or regulate rationally why one 
of its constituents is chosen over all others. Why this repro-
duction rather than another and why this one rather than 
nothing? Th e law of the ‘one’ never rests on certainty, but on 
the dicey play of a multiplicity run amok. 
All this comes to ask the more hackneyed question, why life 
rather than death? No law will be able to extend its jurisdiction 
80 See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. 
L.S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 43–5.
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over such a mystery. A cast of the dice never indeed abolishes 
chance, as the old Mallarmé would say.
It might therefore be fi lth and abject, but the factory’s output 
has a curious propensity to remind human beings—men and 
women—that ultimately no one has control over life, not even 
its proud or shamefaced producers and the ones who accept it 
carelessly, suff er it in disgust, or embrace it productively. 
coglione
Th is perhaps explains why, unlike the pole, the factory is oft en 
seen as an object of ridicule. Some people are embarrassed 
by it, fearing perhaps that the factory is a far too laughable a 
symbol for man-folk’s inability to master life. Other people 
even refuse to touch it, fearing perhaps that, whether they 
want it or not, they might be part of the ridicule.
As an ‘object’ of ridicule, the factory is oft en therefore 
compared to something idiotic or stupid. So much so that there 
are some people who love to kick, knee, squeeze, or otherwise 
abuse the factory. When struck, the factory causes extreme 
pain, which can be either welcome or not.
But this isn’t all; in addition to being compared with 
something stupid, the factory is also considered by many as an 
ugly appendage. Th e fact that its two chambers are most oft en 
asymmetrically positioned could have something to do with it. 
Asymmetry never fi gures as a criterion for beauty in aesthetic 
treaties, the number of fi g or maple leaves and loincloths in the 
history of art partly attest to this.
Finally, the factory is also used as an expression of 
contempt, annoyance, or defi ance, clearly indicating that these 
dangly oblong spheres are really of no importance, that what 
counts is the singularity and mastery of that which is above. In 
these cases, other terms are usually used—oft en by cocky and 
obstreperous people. 
In any case, what all these unpleasant references suggest is 
that the factory is there to remind us that there is always some-
thing a bit risible about man-folk. As Diderot rightly remarked, 
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there is always a bit of testicle at the bottom of men’s most 
sublime feelings and their  purest tenderness.81 Some of men’s 
most awe-inspiring and most hideous thoughts, creations, and 
ideologies would perhaps never have seen the light of day if 
they hadn’t been driven by the annoyingly tiresome work of 
these odd oblong spheres.
extravagance
Notwithstanding its ridiculousness, ugliness, and comical 
aspects, the factory has a curious, but not unique char-
acteristic that distinguishes it from all other factories. Its 
machinery constantly produces at a loss. Th e factory partici-
pates, to follow a specifi c Bataillean vocabulary, in what could 
be termed forms of non-productive expenditures.82
Th is curious characteristic unintentionally challenges 
the commonly held belief (held by both Capitalism and 
Communism, for example) in the primacy of exchange as 
the sphere of meaning and production. Th e factory indeed 
produces at a ridiculous loss because out of an average 10,000 
outputs in a sixty-year life span, only a truly ridiculous number 
is productive. 
Th is clearly shows that, overall, the factory is the unruly 
reverse of work, utility, politics, laws, truth, or knowledge and 
therefore pleasure. As such, the factory is really the opposite 
of what is usually understood by economy; it is, like Adam’s 
parting rib, that which is precisely without return, what is 
always in excess of conventional economy, thus contradicting 
81 Denis Diderot, “Lettre à Damilaville, 3 novembre 1760,” in Correspon-
dance, Vol. III (novembre 1759 - décembre 1761), ed. Georges Roth 
(Paris: Minuit, 1957), 120.
82 Th e following argument is borrowed from Georges Bataille’s analysis 
of eroticism. Th e focus of this chapter is intended to push Bataille’s 
idea in another direction in order to emphasize the liminality of the 
male body’s erotic aft erlife. See Georges Bataille, Th e Accursed Share, 
Vol. 1, trans. R. Hurley (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
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or compensating for man’s obsession with productivity, 
eff ectiveness, leadership, order, authenticity, and wisdom.
In this way, not unlike laughter or drunkenness, this 
factory operates paradoxically in a non-fatherly way, some 
might even say in a perpetually adolescent manner: it operates 
on the basis of an economy that is pure destruction, a repetitive 
squandering of a by-product of health or ill health and this, 
whether in a lovely ‘heterosexual’ or hard-core bare-backing 
environment. 
In a way and if one is permitted to make ruthless appropri-
ations, death and life on earth are not due to the benevolence 
of God or a system that can be scientifi cally comprehended; 
it is partly the result of a senseless and wasteful squan-
dering of energy. In other words, death and life are not due 
to a thought-out plan, but to the fortuitous outcome of a 
preposterous extravagance.
Now it would be wrong to understand this extravagance 
as something that can be quantifi ed or qualifi ed, calculated or 
analysed. However much references are made here to specifi c 
number of ‘outputs,’ the extravagance remains always already 
un-representable because it lies outside of any form of totali-
sation. Th e same goes with artistic experiments (Duchamp’s 
Faulty Landscape 1946, for example): they can never properly 
represent this extravagance. 
Th e activity of squandering recklessly, which curiously 
and in all modesty, goes on a par, as Bataille would say, with 
the sun’s endless prodigality, knows indeed no transcription. 
Th is does not mean that it can only be embodied: pure somatic 
experience, for example. Th is simply means that the anarchy 
of its fl ow can never be translated, classifi ed, ordered. In other 
words, unlike the phallus, which always equals ‘one,’ the 
factory’s produce is alien to any economic system that would 
reduce it in order to allow it to fi nally signify as this or that. 
Of course, one could argue that once the goods are 
channelled through utility, they are necessarily—and perhaps 
now more than ever—always already a form of commodity. 
Th e factory does not obviously operate out of pure generosity. 
It patently operates within a utility framework, that is, through 
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an economic system, or as part of a set of contractual agree-
ments (whether solitary, with another, or with others). In this 
way, what is essentially pure loss is nonetheless still channelled 
through profi t.
But, however much extravagance is used for selfi sh gratifi -
cation and turned into a product for sale (from prostitution, to 
bukkake orgies, to fertility clinics), the factory itself remains 
always already a work of prodigality that only an unfortunate 
accident, a severe localised illness, or death can stop. Th e 
factory is one of the few things in life that produces life, most 
of which is murdered, thus paradoxically emphasizing the 
impossibility of distinguishing it from death. Mother nature 
has obviously no regard for human ethics or feelings because 
it clearly never ceases to prevaricate between life and death. 
unrly gift
Th ere is one major consequence to this reckless extravagance 
that is dangerous to express, for it concerns, as announced in 
the introduction to this chapter, its destination, which, as we 
will see, is not a destiny: ‘for the other.’ 
However problematic it is to acknowledge the following, 
the fact remains that this ‘for the other’ is really (also) a call out 
of self (‘self ’ understood here not as idem, but as ipseity, that 
is, as what is already produced and inscribed as an unstable 
arrangement of sex and gender). Th is is indeed a tricky issue 
because the focus on the conduit above usually determines 
the whole machinery (and by reductive extension, men in 
general) as exclusively self-centered and selfi sh, and therefore 
as necessarily violent. 
Th e argument here is the fact that to produce in such 
prodigal fashion implies an exteriorization that contradicts 
the conduit’s violent unsociableness. Th e factory’s work is a 
call out of self because it knows no interiority. Giving, whether 
out of choice or not, is eff ectively—however infuriating this 
is—its only possible mode of operation. Th is gift  is not, as we 
have seen, an exchange in a conventional economic sense; it 
 The Factor y  | 95
is an ‘unproductive expenditure’ for the other that, beyond 
selfi sh pleasure, can know no return. 
In order to make sense of this dangerous thought, it is 
necessary to think the moment this factory is put to use in the 
encounter with the other—albeit with the same caveat as that 
announced in the Introduction. When it is put to use, it is so 
only with the other as the unforeseeable. Once again, this does 
not reduce the other to a state of invisibility or irrelevance. Th e 
unforeseeable does not mean absence. She, he, or it is what 
cannot be projected upon or predicted as self-evident.
In this way, this other is not another person (man or 
woman), another time (a child), death as such, or a day aft er 
history strictly speaking (God). It is whoever or whatever is 
present at the heart of a shared experience. Present not only as 
a ‘total’ presence (and thus able to respond in disgust or antici-
pation) but also as trace, the trace of the other—that is, as what 
or who is not yet. 
As such, the factory works—before all articles of faith and 
philosophy and before all political protest—as a call out of 
self because it is essentially eschatological at its origin and in 
each of its aspects. In other words, the factory is one of the few 
‘things’ that is able to produce some ‘thing’ that crosses over 
to the other and still manages to remain potentially a ‘beyond 
death’ (and this even if it is temporarily mediated by the gaze). 
Th e fact of being potentially ‘beyond death’ is what 
distinguishes it from any other gesture (love, for example) 
because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, it is the only 
opening onto the future that exceeds all future-presents, that 
is, all forms of projection or predictions. As Levinas rightly 
observes against Heidegger and conventional readings 
of Th e Song of Songs, it is Eros and not love that is stronger 
than death.83
Th is obviously does not mean that, because it is intimately 
coupled with pleasure, it is not also irascibly violent, ines-
capably self-centred, and unbearably selfi sh. ‘Take that’ or 
‘you want it?’ are the usual expressions used in pornography 
83 Levinas, Time and the Other, 76.
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to express such an unbearable violence. However, amidst 
all this brutality, this also expresses a call-out-of-self that 
paradoxically reaches out to what is no longer ipse (and 
this, even if celibacy, chastity, and abstinence are the 
chosen options).  
Th is also does not imply the stability of a possession, the 
security of an always-replenished gift  ‘shop,’ or the assur-
ance that life is secure because of man’s endless propensity 
to produce. Instability, unreliability, and contingency rule 
this productivity. If this was not the case, then men would 
be permanently ‘turned’-on working fountains: a parody 
of life’s munifi cence (cf. Bruce Nauman’s Self-Portrait as 
Fountain, 1966–7).
However, notwithstanding this contingency (or perhaps 
because of it), there is a rather repetitive emphasis that 
perhaps should be taken in consideration: not everything is 
self-absorbed, self-seeking, self-serving and this, however 
much the act itself is inescapably wrapped up in the constitu-
tion of self (ipseity). In other words, however debilitating and 
dangerously unpredictable horniness can be, it is also para-
doxically, a way of rejecting the overwhelming self-suffi  ciency 
of virility (as defi ned in chapter 5, “End(s) Meet”).84
In this way, and however unsettling or disturbing this is if 
one considers humanity’s long history of virile violence, the 
factory’s work is a self-serving appeal to be freed from self 
(ipseity). In other words, the factory’s tireless work is perhaps 
the most unsettling of men’s call, for it remains secretly a 
selfi sh plea to no longer be selfi sh—a plea that can perhaps 
be translated each time anew as: ‘bollocks to Being.’ A rather 
84 In saying this, I deliberately remain prior to the constitution of 
the subject as phallus—hence my repeated reference to ipseity as an 
unstable arrangement (in lieu of idem as a recollected identity). As 
such, I slightly diff er from Michèle Montrelay’s idea that ejaculation is 
a loss of subjectivity in relation to the phallus. For Montrelay’s ideas, 
see: Michèle Montrelay, “L’Appareillage,” Cahiers Confrontations 6 
(Spring 1982): 33–43. For commentaries, see Smith, “Vas,” 95–100; 
and Murat Aydemir, Images of Bliss: Ejaculation, Masculinity, Meaning 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 118–9.
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disconcerting thought when considering the overwhelming 




—Woman was set apart from man, but she came aft er 
him.85
—Or woman is above man, but comes aft er him.
85 Th is fi rst sentence is Annette Aranowicz’s translation of a 
sentence by Emmanuel Levinas taken from Nine Talmudic Readings 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 173. Levinas’s orig-
inal sentence—fi rst read out at a colloquium entitled “Ish and Isha or 
the Other par excellence” in Paris in 1971 —reads: “La femme a été 
prélevée sur l’homme, mais est venue après lui”: Emmanuel Levinas, 
L’Autre dans la conscience Juive (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1973), 121. Th ere is no space here to propose an alternative translation 
(for example: “Woman was extracted from man, but came aft er him” 
or “woman was made before man, but came aft er him”). Th e choice of 
translation is made here in order to emphasize the importance of chro-
nology in Levinas’s choice of words. For a further commentary (and 
yet another translation of this sentence), see: Jacques Derrida, “At Th is 
Very Moment in Th is Work, Here I Am,” in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. 
Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (London: Th e Athlone Press, 
1991), 40. 
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Th is very short exchange of opinions provides two diff erent 
ways one can conceive the relation between man and woman 
as two opposed genders, that is, as two bio-anthropological 
beings confi ned to the logic of the diff erence of sexes. 
Th ese two diff erent ways are not unique. Others could have 
been envisaged.
In this particular exchange, the fi rst sentence epitomizes 
the classic Biblical narrative, one that emphasizes a chrono-
logical progression: Eve was created (or set apart) from Adam’s 
rib, side, face, or tail and was therefore secondary in the history 
of creation. By repeating the story twice (and lessening in the 
process the role of the conjunction ‘but’), the fi rst sentence 
therefore accentuates a teleological order of priority: fi rst man, 
then woman. 
Th e second attempts to think woman not as derived from 
man, as the common readings of the Bible wants us to believe, 
but, as the use of the present tense and the glaring impropriety 
of the conjunction ‘but’ intimates, as part of a game in which 
no order of priority is determined in advance. Th is second 
sentence will form the focus of this fi nal chapter.
Th e aim behind this second sentence and therefore 
behind this reconfi guration or, more precisely, this temporal 
rephrasing of the old Biblical narrative is two-fold: 
Firstly, to show that—paradoxically, considering the chosen 
sentence—it is no longer possible to claim equality between 
man and woman as two opposed autonomous entities.86 As 
we have already seen, equality always returns us to the same 
86 I am obviously aware that this is not a new argument. For example, 
Elizabeth Grosz rightly sums up Irigaray’s views on this topic: “Any 
egalitarian project, whether directed to the equalization of relations 
between the sexes, or between races, classes or ethnicities, is, for 
Irigaray, antagonistic to the project of specifi cation of diff erences. 
Egalitarian projects entail a neutral measure for the attainment of 
equality, a measure that invariably refl ects the value of the dominant 
position”: Elizabeth Grosz, “Th e Nature of Sexual Diff erence,” 
Angelaki: Journal of the Th eoretical Humanities 17, no. 2 (2012): 73. My 
aim in repeating this argument is to draw attention to how a question 
of temporality exposes the strict impossibility of equality and this, way 
before any political (egalitarian) project has been formulated.
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and therefore to man. Th e study of this second sentence will 
attempt—and attempt only—to demonstrate how to avoid this 
seemingly inevitable return.
Secondly, to show, once again, but this time, from a 
diff erent perspective, that it is no longer possible to think of 
mankind on the basis of a singular origin: fi rst, God, then 
androgynous/male Adam, and then Eve. As we have seen, 
man and woman are born together as separation (cf. chapter 4, 
“Th e Side Story”). Th eir ‘dislocation’ or ‘disjointedness’ shows 
that when it comes to their (measured) spatial and temporal 
interaction, they always fi nd themselves at least in the text—
and this is what remains to be shown—both paradoxically in a 
symmetrical and asymmetrical relation. 
Please note that the following text will remain purely 
exegetical,87 i.e. it will only attempt to be a commentary on the 
second sentence above. As such, it will not attempt to rethink 
the Biblical narrative or to put forward an analysis of how 
man and woman (should) relate to each other in ‘real’ life. If 
such exegetical analysis infl uences positively the way the Bible 
is read or the way man and woman relate to each other, then 
there will be an assumption that this is a good thing.
Although the following stays at an exegetical level, there 
will be here no specifi c theological reading or analysis of the 
87 I am aware of the dangers that exist in remaining at a purely exegetical 
level. Th e intention here is not to reduce woman to a mere abstract 
referent and ignore the historically and geo-politically disenfran-
chised. Like all words, woman or man can no longer be understood 
at a unifying essentialist level, but (at least) as a doubling of levels: 
an onto-epistemological and a historical bio-anthropological. As this 
book attempts to show, these levels cannot be understood indepen-
dently of each other. And as this paragraph shows, the hope here is 
therefore to re-think once again (and by me here, inevitably and 
once again, fraudulently) the relation between man and woman at an 
exegetical level in the hope that ‘subsequently’ the word ‘woman’ no 
longer simply stands for what Spivak calls the ‘gendered subaltern.’ 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Feminism and Deconstruction, 
Again: Negotiating with Unacknowledged Masculinism,” in Between 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. Teresa Brennan (London: Routledge, 
1993), 220.
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passages in Th e Bible that refer to the theme of this sentence. 
Many scholars have examined the discrepancy between Adam 
and Eve. From Jonathan ben Uzziel to Rashi and from Rabbi 
Samson Raphael Hirsch to Azila Talit Reisenberger, the list 
is long and to pretend adding something new to this long 
list would simply be preposterous in the present context. 
Th e following chapter is simply inspired by the work of two 
scholars: Levinas’s Talmudic Readings and Derrida’s careful 
reading of Levinas, notably in his very much un-examined 
text, “At Th is Very Moment in Th is Work, Here I Am.” Once 
again, there will be no masterly commentary on these scholar’s 
work88; only a side reading with the intention of departing 
elsewhere. 
questions
Woman is above man, but comes aft er him. Th is curious 
sentence raises at least three crucial sets of questions: 
Firstly, is it at all possible to say something so irretrievably 
odd: at once gracious and bad mannered: woman higher than 
man, but also left  behind? What kind of political correctness 
is this? 
Secondly, is it really possible to divide genders in this way: 
between a space extending upwards (‘above’) at the end of 
which woman ‘is’ and a time (‘aft er’) allowing man to ‘be’? Do 
genders need to be spaced and temporized in this way? 
And fi nally, if one were to follow the logic of such 
juxtaposition, why choose the prepositions ‘above’ and ‘aft er’ 
instead of ‘below’ and ‘before’? In other words, can one write: 
‘man is below woman, but comes before her’ and if yes, does 
this alter the meaning of what is at stake here? 
88 Th e list of commentators who have engaged in cross-readings of 
Levinas and Derrida is extensive and cannot be replicated here. I can 
only report readers to the careful work of Richard A. Cohen, Hent de 
Vries, Martin Hägglund, John Llwelyn, Jill Robins, Martin C. Srajek, 
Chloe Taylor and Agata Zielinski amongst others.
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Th ese questions will be addressed in the following text, but 
in a non-sequential way.
lofty-lowly/late-early
Th is sentence is intended to refer to an inextricable perpen-
dicular relation: a vertical order (above-below) intercepting 
a horizontal order (before-aft er). It is a relation and not a 
dislocation or disjointedness as in chapter 2, because we are 
here in the realm of the diff erence of sexes and therefore in 
measured space and time. In such context, genders relate to 
one another; they express narratives about each other and 
these narratives, whether ‘straight’ or ‘queer,’ take space and 
time to unfold.
Th e aim of this specifi c perpendicular relation is to avoid 
thinking subjectivity (man or woman) outside of an inter-
subjective structure. Subjectivity is always already structured 
by the other not in a relation of equality (man recognizing his 
equal or his opposite in woman, for example) or inequality 
(man and woman relating to each other as god or monster, 
divine or diabolical), but in a perpendicular relation that, as 
we will see, is both equal and unequal. 
How can one make sense of this perpendicular relation?
Th e sentence in question here involves a man and a woman, 
who on all accounts could be alter egos to each other. Th e fact 
that one is above and comes aft er does not necessarily preclude 
the fact that one order can indeed be equal to the other. Man 
and woman remain in this sentence overall equals. 
However, if one takes their respective positions in 
consideration, one could also make the following two state-
ments: fi rstly, woman is always loft ier in relation to man who 
is always lowly. Secondly, one could also say that man is always 
early in relation to woman who is always late. 
Th e question that ensues here is therefore this: how does her 
lateness relate with her loft iness? Alternatively, the question 
is also this: how does his earliness relate with the fact of 
being lowly? 
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Th ese questions cannot be answered simply because it is 
not possible to decide between loft iness and lowliness and 
between lateness and earliness. Th is impossibility to decide 
is fi rstly due to the fact that there cannot be a single vantage 
point (male, female, neutral) from which to relate these 
terms together. Without exterior and therefore without the 
possibility of objectifi cation, the vantage point simply does 
not exist.
Th is impossibility to decide is also due to the inevi-
table substitutability of the relation (cf. “Sexual Diff erence”): 
Woman does not exclusively express a spatial coordinate (above 
/ below) and man does not exclusively express a temporal one 
(before / aft er). Both create and take space and time while 
‘being’ (in) space and time as such. 
Th eir relation is therefore one of vicissitude: he appears in 
this sentence lowly and too early, but he could also equally be, 
who knows, loft y and too late. Th e orders could be substituted 
and this substitutability coupled with this lack of vantage point 
are eff ectively what prevents anyone from relating loft iness 
with lateness, earliness with lowliness. 
In this way, it is impossible to ascribe a one-to-one 
correspondence between man and woman as if each would 
hold a neat parcel of space and time. In a perpendicular relation 
of vicissitude, man and woman trouble each other as they 
trouble space and time, thus making it impossible to conceive 
a strict equality between them—at least not in a conventional 
understanding of equality.
Th e troubled structure in question here is therefore an 
odd perpendicular relation of vicissitude between man and 
woman that cannot be detached from the way space and time 
relate to each other: spacing (and) temporizing space and time. 
(Once again, this perpendicularity is neither unique nor is it a 
universal structure. If the argument above has any validity, it 
needs to assume that other ‘relation’ would be equally true.)
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diachrony
In order to articulate further such a relation, it is crucial to 
remember (cf. Sexual Diff erence) that this relation operates 
eff ectively under a specifi c law: the law of absolute heteronomy 
(diachrony). Th is law establishes that the relation between man 
and woman is always already a relation of vicissitude that is 
also incalculable and unpredictable.
In other words, man and woman relate to each other and 
this relation of vicissitude is always already in the hands of 
contingency or the unforeseeable. Th ere is no other way of 
understanding this relation. If there were another way of doing 
so, one would automatically return to an understanding of 
subjectivity (man or woman) as self-contained objects in space 
and time.
However, once again, this law does not imply that 
there is something external (God, for example) that simply 
renders genders prone to contingency. No God rules the law 
of absolute heteronomy; it is always already in the hands of 
those who create, make, and take space and time, that is, it 
is always already in the hands of man, woman and their 
own (un)predictability. 
Th is relation between genders can never therefore be 
autonomous strictly speaking, that is, synchronized as some 
logically recognizable ‘thing.’ In order for it to also be incal-
culable and unpredictable, in order for it to also be absolute, 
it cannot be turned into ‘a moment’ in space and time. Th e 
law would no longer be eff ective. Man and woman would obey 
a diff erent law—a homonymous law, for example—where 
nothing could tell them apart and space and time would have 
no meaning whatsoever.
Th e law of absolute heteronomy that puts man and woman 
always already in a perpendicular relation eff ectively comes 
with their own diachrony; i.e. it is what (il)logically relates 
space and time and therefore genders together. It is (il)logical 
because, as we will see, it both makes sense and fails to make
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 sense. For obvious reasons, diachrony or the law of absolute 
heteronomy can never entirely make sense.
But in that case, can one really say this?
the phrase
Th e chosen sentence aims to match the unruly operational 
principle it describes. Th is is done with the use of a specifi c 
tense: the present tense indeed refuses here a teleological 
order of priority, thus equalizing—albeit here oddly—man 
and woman. Th ere are here together in the present and they 
understand each other with the use of a synchronic tense.
But this is not quite exact, the sentence also manages to 
disrupt its own synchronic grammar: the sentence, like the 
relation it describes, somewhat (also) fails to make sense (the 
‘but’ is eff ectively given here all its weight, thus rendering 
the sentence illogical) and yet still makes sense (the sentence 
remains indeed grammatically correct).
As such, the sentence is representative of the relation 
between man and woman: it demonstrates the fact that the 
relation of vicissitude between man and woman is a logical 
absurdity89: that on the one hand, it is symmetrical, it some-
what makes sense, it is outwardly logical, and on the other, 
89 I borrow this expression from Jacques Derrida and develop it at 
length in Aft er ‘Rwanda.’ Commenting on Levinas’s work, Derrida 
writes: “Th e other as alter ego signifi es the other as other, irreducible 
to my ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of 
the ego. Th e egoity of the other permits him to say ‘ego’ as I do; and 
this is why he is Other and not a stone, or a being without speech in 
my real economy. Th is is why, if you will, he is face, can speak to me, 
understand me, and eventually command me. Dissymmetry itself 
would be impossible without this symmetry, which is not of the world, 
and which, having no real aspect, imposes no limit upon alterity and 
dissymmetry—makes them possible, on the contrary. Th is dissym-
metry is an economy in a new sense; a sense which would probably 
be intolerable to Levinas. Despite the logical absurdity of this formula-
tion, this economy is the transcendental symmetry of two empirical 
asymmetries”: Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 157, my emphasis.
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it is radically dissymmetrical, it fails to make sense or, more 
precisely, it falls out of sense, it is absurd, not in the sense of 
foolishness, but in the sense of what knows no logical ground. 
In this way, both the sentence and, speculatively, the 
reality to which it refers, manage to weave together what is 
out of synch and out of grammar (diachrony) with what is 
recognizable as being in synch and in grammar (synchrony). 
However, because we are in a relation of vicissitude, what is out 
of synch can also ‘be’ what is synchronized. In other words, 
diachrony can also ‘be’ synchrony and vice-versa. Th e phrase 
(and perhaps the reality) can only remain a logical absurdity.
Obviously, and as previously stated, the aim behind this 
odd sentence and structure is to refuse to be ossifi ed in any one 
spatial, temporal, social, cultural, or biological construct. For 
every new space and time, there is a new man or woman and 
vice-versa. For every new sentence, there is another one, thus 
keeping the logical absurdity always on edge.
contrition
But the question persists: the above explanation still retains 
as its essential directive a certain sense: it synchronizes its 
various elements in order to articulate a relationship between 
man and woman that is neither oppositional nor hierarchical 
(and therefore equal or unequal), but both diachronic and 
synchronic, logical, absurd. In other words, the above expla-
nation still manages to synchronize an onto-epistemological 
situation, a synchronization that ultimately betrays the law of 
absolute heteronomy.
Th e question is therefore this: If one attempts to think 
exegetically the relation between man and woman, is one then 
perpetually confi ned to the phallo-logo-centric violence of 
synchronic (philosophical) grammar—and therefore to the 
primacy of man? In other words, is this interpretation basically 
a man’s point of view?
For example, as a man and as the ‘author’ of this text, am 
I violently appropriating woman by placing her above me 
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while I, obviously, come fi rst? However much I emphasize our 
vicissitude, am I not being here disingenuous? And if yes, am 
I then continuing the tradition started by Plato of an under-
standing of philosophy as an exclusively andro-social—i.e. 
homo-social—dialogical discourse?
If answers to the above questions are all in the affi  rmative, 
am I then yet another cliché in the long history of philosophy? 
Am I here buggering feminist discourses? Is this temporal 
recasting of the Biblical narrative a man-on-man immaculate 
conception based on a random list of texts mostly written by 
men (from Yahweh to Meillassoux, for example): yet another 
monstrous off spring?
If all this were indeed the case, then this text would recast 
itself within the conventional demarcations of gender. It would 
not understand man and woman as a complex and ambivalent 
perpendicular relation of signifi cation and excess. If this were 
really the case, then philosophy would have to admit defeat 
and remain deaf to the spacing (and) temporizing of genders.
So… can this new reconfi guration or rephrasing tells us 
something we don’t already know? 
freedom
Perhaps most simply that it is impossible to evade the gendered 
structure that animates any text or scene whatsoever: 
diachrony weaving (itself in) synchrony as it pulls apart. In 
this way, whatever we do and however we read, we can always 
hear genders resonate, not in perfect harmony (a delusional 
perfect equality) or absolute disharmony (the total exploita-
tion of the one over the other), but in the anarchy of diachrony, 
the lawlessness of the law of absolute heteronomy. 
Th e crucial step here is that this impossibility of evading 
the law of heteronomy does not mean that man and woman 
or the phrase itself (always) take place in pure randomness. 
Th e relation of vicissitude between man and woman can 
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only be always already amortized,90 that is, translated by a 
synchronic grammar and/or phrased by a philosophy aware of 
its imminent disaster.
In other words, in order for the perpendicular play between 
man and woman to be heard properly, the play needs to be 
amortized (i.e. rendered fi nite, ad + mortem) by a synchronic 
(i.e. phallo-logo-centric) grammar. Th ere would be no text 
(and therefore no sex between men and/or women) otherwise. 
Th is does not mean that there is no hope or that yet again 
the masculine and therefore men in general secretly win the 
trophy of meaning. If one takes on board both the perpen-
dicular dislocation of sexual diff erence and the perpendicular 
relation of the diff erence of sexes, then, however much both of 
these ‘structures’ are amortized by a synchronic grammar, the 
conclusion is self-evident: no one wins anything because there 
is nothing to win: diachrony will never overtake synchrony 
and vice versa.
Th is also does not mean that the perpendicular relation 
envisaged here is eff ectively unworkable or useless. Although 
this new reconfi guration or rephrasing is still outside of the 
political realm (for being mainly exegetical), it still attempts 
nonetheless to recast the problem diff erently so as not to allow 
a return to/of the same and to/of the inevitable horror that 
comes with the gleeful ‘assurance’ of mastery. 
Indeed, with this reconfi guration that neither privileges 
perfect equality nor aspires to return to a supposedly natural 
or religious hierarchy, a next step is perhaps made here to 
ensure that women are no longer understood as secondary, 
forced to ‘mime’ phallic authority, put on a ‘masquerade’ or, 
worse still, attempt a problematic mystical a-logical writing. 
Synchronic grammar woven in diachrony belongs to all. 
Monstrous off spring are unavoidable, even in the most radical 
of feminist philosophies.
90 “Concepts suppose an anticipation, a horizon within which alterity 
is amortized as soon as it is announced precisely because it has let 
oneself be foreseen. [Le concept suppose une anticipation, un horizon 
où l’alterité s’armortit en s’annonçant, et de se laisser prévoir]”: Derrida, 
‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 118, my emphasis.
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With this new reconfi guration or rephrasing, diachrony 
and women and synchrony and men and vice versa can no 
longer be understood independently of each other, but as part 
and forming a logical absurdity in which the radically heter-
onymous is given its say. In this way, man and woman have 
no other choice but to remain for ever unequal and yet tied to 
each other in perfect equality because always already creating, 
making, and taking space and time. 
Th ere is no freedom from this logical absurdity because 
it is the condition of freedom itself. Philosophy must now 
begin to assume its spacing (and) temporizing genders and to 
philosophize otherwise in order to respect the exigency that 
thinking accords with our bodies. 
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